A study of the functional relationship between John Dewey\u27s theory of inquiry and classroom teaching strategies designed to implement inquiry thinking. by Barber, James C.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1979
A study of the functional relationship between John
Dewey's theory of inquiry and classroom teaching
strategies designed to implement inquiry thinking.
James C. Barber
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barber, James C., "A study of the functional relationship between John Dewey's theory of inquiry and classroom teaching strategies
designed to implement inquiry thinking." (1979). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3469.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3469

A STUDY OF THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF INQUIRY AND
CLASSROOM TEACHING STRATEGIES
DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT
INQUIRY THINKING
A Dissertation Presented
By
JAMES C . BARBER
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
May 197 9
Education
© James C . Barber 1979
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
A STUDY OF THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF INQUIRY AND
CLASSROOM TEACHING STRATEGIES
DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT
INQUIRY THINKING
A Dissertation Presented
By
JAMES C. BARBER
Approved as to style and content by:
B. /Scribner
,
Chairperson of Committee
David Kinsey, Memb^erb^f
Curt Tausky, Member
Mario D. Fantini , /Dean
School of Education
111
DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to a great teacher,
my wife Judith. Without her sacrifices and encourage-
ment, I would never have started nor finished this
dissertation. Its completion is a tribute to her love
and understanding. Us canl
I would also like to dedicate this dissertation
to all those who along the way have given me a kind
word or two of support. This has been much appreciated.
A lesson that I have learned is that support from others
is as necessary to life as is the air that is breathed.
IV
ABSTRACT
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Designed to Implement
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,
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Directed by; Professor Harvey B. Scribner
The principal question addressed in this study is,
"How can John Dewey's theory of inquiry contribute to
constructing strategies of inquiry teaching?" There are
also five secondary questions which are addressed. These
secondary questions assist in answering the primary
question. The secondary questions are: (1) What are the
issues involved in the relating of theory to practice?
(2) What is Dewey's theory of inquiry? (3) Have there
been any significant attempts to implement the theory?
V
VI
(4) What vrould the integration of theory and practice be
like? (5) What are some conclusions and recommendations
th© use of the theory?
The issues involved in the question of relating
theory to practice and Dewey's position on the issues are
presented. Dewey's theory of inquiry is explicated. At-
tention is focused on the logic of inquiry and on the
role of experience. Comparative analysis is used to
heighten the distinctions between Dewey's philosophy and
the philosophy of logical positivism. The "project
method" of William Heard Kilpatrick is offered as an ex-
ample of a distorted conception of Dewey's philosophy.
The use of Dewey's philosophy at the laboratory school
which Dewey founded and directed is presented. Inquiry
teaching strategies that conform to Dewey's theory of
inquiry are presented. These strategies are critiqued
with reference to the philosophical foundation of Dewey's
theory of inquiry. Recommendations and conclusions re-
garding Dewey's theory and possible uses of it as a basis
for teaching strategies are offered.
The teaching strategies presented are derived from
an interpretation of Dewey that rejects an exclusively
child-centered as well as a positivistic approach to
inquiry. A teacher's use of Dewey's entire philosophy as
a basis for making classroom decisions about inquiry teach-
ing is stressed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
In general, most classroom teachers tend to view
philosophy and theory as not having much relevance to
teaching practice. In particular, in their inquiry
teaching, most teachers tend to overlook the philosophy
and theory of John Dewey.
The separation of Dewey's theory from its practice
has resulted in teachers failing to take advantage of
teaching strategies which logically can be derived from
the theory. This failure has resulted in teaching that
misrepresents Dewey's notions of inquiry. Equally, this
failure to connect Dewey's theory with practice has re-
sulted, as Lawrence Metcalf has pointed out, in Dewey's
theory of inquiry never receiving a substantial test in
practice .
^
1
^Lawrence E. Metcalf, "Research on Teaching the
Social Studies," in Handbook of Research on Teaching , ed.
N. L. Gage (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 933.
2The Purpose
The purpose of this study is twofold. The first
is to examine the use of John Dewey’s theory of inquiry
as a guide to teaching practice. The second is to examine
the practical value of philosophy and theory. Dewey's
theory of inquiry, and the function that it can serve to
guide in the development of inquiry teaching strategies,
offered as the quintessence of the relationship between
theory and practice. Thus, the primary question addressed
in this study is, "How can Dewey's theory of inquiry con-
tribute to constructing strategies of inquiry teaching?"
An assumption of this study is that, in general,
connections are rarely established between philosophy and
educational practice. The American temperament tends to
reject dealing with abstractions and tends to be impatient
with philosophy. Significant philosophical issues, such
%
as the nature of knowledge, the role of values, and the
nature of reality, tend to be viewed as speculations
having little, if any, relationship to practice. On this
matter, the educational philosopher Hugh Black said,
"Most of the time we pay no attention to theory, and in
American education knowledge of educational philosophy
2
counts for very little."
^Hugh C. Black, "Educational Phj.losophy and Theory
in the United States—A Commentary," Educational Theory
20 (Winter 70) : 77
.
3A second assumption of this study is that if there
is, in general, a lack of relating theory with practice,
there is, in particular, a lack of relating Dewey's theory
of inquiry with inquiry teaching practices. in fact,
research indicates that the average classroom teacher does
not have an understanding of Dewey's philosophy.^
On the other hand, teachers do have ideas. These
ideas may not qualify as full-fledged philosophical
thought, but nonetheless they affect classroom teaching
behavior. Some of these ideas conform to Dewey's
philosophy. Some of these ideas are in conflict v/ith
Dewey's philosophy. Hopefully, this study will serve to
assist one to clarify his ideas relative to Dewey's
philosophy. It is hoped that by doing such, Dewey will
not be associated with teaching strategies and ideas
contrary to his philosophy.
It should be stated that Dewey has become a compara-
tively neglected figure. He is hardly ever studied any-
more. In fact, he is studied even less today than in
4previous years. Steven Cahn has recently remarked,
"Ironically, Dewey, so long the dominant force on the
^Metcalf, "Research," p. 933.
^Steven M. Cahn, "Introduction," in Nev/ Studies in
The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover,
New Hampshire : University Press of New England, 1977) ,
p. viii.
4American philosophical scene, is now, less than twenty-
five years after his death, no longer much studied or
discussed . "
^
The irony is extended even further when it is
realized that inquiry teaching does take place in the
nation's classrooms. Consequently, an important issue
is the kind of inquiry teaching taking place. The author
o^ this study contends that the kind of inquiry teaching
presently being employed is not lacking in a philosophical
foundation. The foundation may be by default rather than
by design; nonetheless, it is contended that the concrete
activities of the classroom will manifest a philosophy.
In this regard, this study may serve to shed some light
on the philosophical nature of present inquiry teaching
efforts
.
The teaching strategies that will be presented here
have been derived from a particular interpretation of
Dewey's ideas. The interpretation of Dewey represented in
this dissertation is not a unique or a novel one. If it
should seem to the reader that this interpretation of
Dewey is an unusual one, it may be because it is less well
known than are other interpetations of his work.
It is asserted by the author that an explanation of
Dewey's theory of inquiry with concomitant teaching ex-
^Ibid
.
5amples happens to be a rarity. There have been countless
articles and books on Dewey's philosophy, but there have
been few attempts to examine the relationship between
Dewey's theory and the development of inquiry teaching
f:
strategies
.
Fi nally
, the author feels that a contribution of
this dissertation has been to reopen a neglected inter-
pretation of Dewey's philosophy and to present actual
teaching examples that would logically follow from the in-
terpretation.
The Design
Research has been made into the major writings of
John Dewey. Primary sources, as well as supplementary
sources, are used. Comparative analysis is used. For
example, Dewey's philosophy is compared to traditional
notions of logic.
Critical analysis is used. A critical analysis is
made of the "Project Method" of William Heard Kilpatrick.
The critical analysis is used to illustrate the distor-
tions that may result when an attempt is made to relate
Dev/ey's philosophy to educational practice.
It can be said that the design of the dissertation
has four major characteristics:
^Metcalf, "Research," p. 934.
6(1) The descriptive-analytic, articulating and
nicking explicit Dewey's theory of inguiry.
(2) The prescriptive-practical, presenting examples
of inquiry teaching which conform to Dewey's
theory
.
(3) The historical study. A critique of Kil-
patrick's conception of Dewey's ideas.
(4) Conclusions and recommendations. As a result
of this study, there will be conclusions and
recommendations pertaining to Dewey's theory of
inquiry and its use in the classroom.
The primary question addressed in this study is,
"How can Dewey's theory of inquiry contribute to construct-
ing strategies of inquiry teaching?" There are also five
implementing questions to be addressed in this study that
assist in answering the primary question. The five ques-
tions are; (1) What are the issues involved in the re-
lating of theory to practice? (2) What is Dewey's theory
of inquiry? (3) Have there been any significant attempts
to implement the theory? (4) What would the integration
of theory and practice be like? (5) What are some conclu-
sions and recommendations regarding the use of the theory?
The five implementing questions serve as the basis
for the chapters of the dissertation. They establish the
purpose of each particular chapter . By responding to these
7questions, the primary question of the dissertation will
be addressed.
Delimitation
This dissertation will not attempt to justify or de-
fend Dewey's theory of inquiry or his philosophy, neither
it attempt to change those people who are resistant.
The dissertation attempts to examine the significance
of Dewey's ideas as they pertain to inquiry teaching. The
significance of these ideas, and not the defense of them,
constitutes the major emphasis of the dissertation.
The dissertation does not attempt to answer the ques-
tion of the overall effectiveness of using Dewey's theo-
retical base to derive instructional strategies of inquiry.
The dissertation will not attempt to definitively
establish what constitutes inquiry behavior. It will give
general norms for inquiry behavior from the Deweyan per-
spective .
The dissertation does not establish itself as the
grand interpreter of Dewey's philosophy, or of what con-
stitutes teaching behavior according to and from his
philosophy. The dissertation does suggest, however, that
the teaching strategies developed are dependent upon the
interpretation. Therefore, to do justice to Dewey, this
dissertation does not hold that it has the absolute in-
terpretation .
8Definition of Terms
Concept : The relationship made from data or experi-
ence. Concepts are ideas. They are the intellectual
deposits of an experience. They have varying degrees of
generality. Concepts are used to organize our experience.
2 .
E = MC IS a concept, and so is "Culture is learned." A
relationship between culture and learned has been estab-
lished .
Experience : Used in the Deweyan sense, it is the
transaction between self and environment. Through the
process of self and environment acting upon and influencing
each other, experience is created. Experience is the
result of a transaction. It stands for all of our commerce
with the world. It is binary, not solitary. Experience
is dependent upon something else with which to transact.
Hitting a tennis ball is an experience. There is the per-
son and there is the tennis ball, not to mention the
racquet
.
Inquiry : This term can be described more than it
can be defined. For the purposes of this study inquiry has
two meanings. In one, it is the method of science. In
the ether meaning, inquiry is more than the method of
science. In this usage, it is the process formulated by
Dewey of deriving and testing concepts. The concepts can
be used to solve problems. It is the method of thinking
9by which human beings organize their experiences through
the construction of concepts that can be tested and trans-
ferred to many different situations. Use of the method
could result in warranted assertions or knowledge claims
being made. Inquiry carries within it its own value
system. Inquiry is an experimental attitude. It is a way
of viewing life. It is a way of dealing with life. It is
a way of dealing with experience.
Inquiry Teaching Strategies ; This is a very inclu-
sive term, and it is meant to be. Incruiry teaching
strategies refers to all of those things a teacher can do
to have students develop skills and values which conform
to Dev/ey's philosophy. The criteria used are that the
learning experiences planned by the teacher must have a
basis in Dewey's philosophy and can be related to the parts
of his philosophy as well as the whole of his philosophy.
In essence, what the teacher does in one particular learn-
ing situation can be understood by viewing it in its rela-
tionship to other parts of the philosophy the teacher has
used for constructing learning experiences. Inquiry teach-
ing strategies refers to what the teacher is doing, which
is basically planning his teaching using Dewey's philosophy
as a guide.
10
Empiricism : The philosophical belief that our knowl-
edge is the result of our experiences with the world.
Experience is external. Experience imprints upon us what
we know. We do not have to transact with experience. We
merely have to be exposed to it.
Pragmatism : The belief that knowledge comes from,
experience. However, experience is a transaction, not an
imprinting of sensations. The given world of "brute facts"
depends upon human beings to give it meaning. The elements
of experience may be a given, but the experience itself is
not a given. The experience is the relationship made from
our transaction with the given elements. The experience,
thus, results in concepts or hypotheses being developed.
When we talk about pragmatism we are referring to Dewey's
philosophical position.
Positivism: The view that knowledge comes from
experience. However, there is an objective world that
exists independently of human transaction. Reality is an
objective world with an already formed character. Human
transaction is not necessary to its meaning. Positivism
also contends that the knowledge that comes from experience
can be reduced to basic elements. Certain statements which
cannot be reduced, generally value statements, are meaning-
less .
11
Functional Relationship ; A relationship of utility.
A and B both have utility in relation to each other.
Theory serves to give practice direction. Practice serves
to irnplernent th© ideas and principles of theory.
Theory : Theory is a logical framework. Ideas are
related to each other so as to”explain a set of facts or
experience and provide guidelines to action. For our pur-
poses, theory can be used interchangeably with the term
philosophy. They both deal with abstractions to guide
human conduct. On the other hand, as used in this study,
theory is assumed to be subsumed within philosophy. Many
theories constitute a philosophy. For example, a philoso-
phy comprises a theory of knowledge, a theory of values,
and a theory of being or ontology.
Transference ; The principle that what is learned in
the formal school setting should be able to be used out-
side of the formal setting, and what is learned outside of
the formal school setting should be able to be transferred
inside to it. It is also the attempt to apply previously
learned ideas and skills to a new situation.
CHAPTER I I
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THEORY TO PRACTICE
xh© purpos© of this chapt©r is to introduc© th© sig—
nif^cant issu©s g©n©rat©d by th© d©bat© ov©r th© natur© of
th© relationship of theory to practice, and then to present
Dewey's position on the matter. The contention is that
Dewey's position on the matter is reflected throughout
his philosophy.
An Introduction to the Function of Theory
A brief overview of the function of theory finds
that it has many functions. Theory puts the results of
scientific investigation into a system. Theory plays a
part in establishing empirical laws. Theory is used to
]_
explain experience. Theory is used to guide inquiry.
The philosopher Ernest Nagel maintains that there
are four functions of theory. In the first function,
theory is a body of propositions used to explain experi-
ence, for example, Marxian theory. In the second function,
^Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology
for Behavioral Science (Scranton: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1964), p. 302.
12
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theory is used to refer to an individual law or generali-
zation, for example, "The law of effect" in psychology,
or the laws of thermodynamics in physics. in the third
function, theory is used to designate a class of variables
or attributes. Keynesian economic theory is an example.
This theory rests on single attributes such as the national
income, and the total investment and consumption expendi-
t^re, which are classified into a structure. In the fourth
function of theory, theory is used to clarify concepts.
For exam.ple, the concepts of Newton's theory of gravitation
would receive further analysis and clarification in light
of Einstein's theory of relativity. In essence, one theory
2IS used to clarify another theory.
Introduction to Descriptive
and Prescriptive Theory
Two critical points of view concerning theory and
its relation to practice are identified in the literature.
The focus is on the meaning of these views in terms of
educational theory and practice. The first point of view
is represented by those philosophers who contend that theory
does not have a relationship to practice. In this view,
^Ernest Nagel, "Philosophy of Science and Educational
Theory," Studies in Philosophy and Education 7 (Fall 69):
8 - 11 .
14
theory is perceived to be purely a detached scientific
account of the teaching and the learning process.
Conversely, the second point of view is represented
by those philosophers who contend that theory can provide
guidelines for teaching practice. Generally, but not
always, empirical findings provide the basis for the guide-
lines. The tendency is to view behavioral scientific
theory as capable of providing guidelines for teaching
practice. This view perceives educational theory to be
normative. In this view, theory is capable of establishing
a criterion for practice.
These two points of view reflect two philosophical
positions. The positions can be stated thusly: theory is
descriptive. Theory is prescriptive. It is contended that
the adoption of either one of these positions or variations
of them can have a bearing on the treatment of theory in
its relationship to practice.
Descriptive Theory
Descriptive theory is empirical theory. It is
scientific theory. Scienrific principles are constructed.
Logical conclusions are drawn from the principles. Predic-
tions are made. There is experimental confirmation of
15
2hypotheses. Descriptive theory purports to tell what is
the case. It attempts to describe the world as it is,
without making use of value judgments. Newton's theory
of gravitation is an example of descriptive theory.
Newton's theory is used to describe and explain actual
events in experience. Experience is deemed to be capable
of being described objectively. Much research and evalua-
tion claims to be descriptive. It claims to be an objec-
tive measurement of observable facts. It claims that
experience can be quantified uncontaminated by subjective
factors, or measures can be employed that make allowance for
the contamination. In this view, there is a division be-
tween objectivity and subjectivity. There is a division
between facts and values. Facts are facts. They can be
measured. They can be counted.
Descriptive theorists . Ernest Nagel is one of the most
prestigious proponents of the descriptive theory view.
Nagel holds that the function of empirical theory is to
describe and to explain experience, not to make prescrip-
tive assertions about what ought to be. Nagel does not
believe that descriptions can be yielded from prescriptions.
Nagel objects on the grounds of logic. Logically,
^Millard Clements, "Theory and Education," Educational
Theory 12 (April 1962): 124-125.
16
prescriptions and descriptions are unlike terms. Nagel
argues that descriptive propositions do not contain value
terms; therefore, it is logically impossible to derive a
value term from them."^ Nagel says, "In short, I subscribe,
certainly, to the very ancient proposition that statements
as to what ought to be are not deducible from statements
of what is despite the attempts to confuse the issue by a
great number of people, who argue that in some way this is
possible . "
^
Nagel contends that it is a mistaken view to contend
that philosophy, even if it contains empirical propositions,
can be used prescriptively . For that matter, Nagel does not
think that behavioral scientific theory can be used to de-
rive prescriptions for practice. Nagel is contending that
from an empirical psychological theory such as Skinner's
operant conditioning theory, it is logically impossible to
derive educational practices. In this regard Nagel says,
"And I would like to ask, in the first place, can educa-
tional aims be derived from any descriptive theory of human
"^Ernest Nagel, "Philosophy of Science and Educational
Theory," Studies in Philosophy and Education 7 (Fall 69):
17.
^Ibid.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 19
.
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nature? And I want to maintain that this is not, in point
of fact, possible.""^
Nagel is a dualist. He asserts rational method
cannot be used to make value judgments because values are
outside the ambit of scientific inquiry. Values do not
have an empirical base. Facts can be empirical. Values
cannot be empirical. Nagel argues for a philosophv of
science, or a descriptive theory that, in his words, "calls
attention to basic distinctions such as that between fact
and value and the way in which factual statements require
to be supported, and the way in which value judgments re-
9quire to be ^justified."
The philosopher B. 0. Smith is in accord with Nagel's
descriptive position. B. O. Smith states, "Any effort to
apply philosophical or scientific knowledge directly to
teaching will fail."^^ Smith, like Nagel, is skeptical of
inferring from any philosophical or behavioral scientific
theory a prescription for teaching. In Smith's view,
descriptive theory is empirical and not subject to the
derivation of value assertions
"^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 19.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 26
.
^^B. 0. Smith, "Toward a Theory of Teaching," in Theory
and Research in Teaching, ed. Arno A. Bellack (New York:
Teachers College Press, 1960), p. 2.
11 Ibid
.
18
Prescriptive Theory
Prescriptive theory recommends and provides guide-
lines for practice. Prescriptive theory is normative.
It suggests what ought to be the case. An important claim
Prescriptive theory is that what ought to be the case
can be derived from what is the case. In essence, pre-
scriptions can be derived or implied from descriptions.
For example, if it is a finding of science that men engage
in inquiry in a certain way, then this is the way inquiry
ought to be taught in the schools. The findings also
imply inquiry ought to be taught.
On the other hand, as P. L. Smith states, "Prescrip-
tive assertions tell us what ought to be the case, regard-
12less of what is the case." Generally, however, prescrip-
tions are derived from a descriptive account of the world.
Clements states, "Prescription in education should be based
on descriptive knowledge of the world, educational phenomena,
and acquaintance with the values and aspirations of a
culture.
There are countless examples of prescriptive theory.
Marxist theory is an example. From its scientific account
^^P. L. Smith, "On Creating and Using Standards,"
Educational Theory 28 (Winter 1978): 44.
^^Clements, "Theory and Education," p. 128.
19
of experience, it prescribes what the role of the state
ought to be in the life of its citizens. The organiza-
tional management theory of Douglas McGregor is an example
of prescriptive theory . This theory prescribes how the
management of organizations ought to be conducted.
Instructional theory is an example of prescriptive
theory. Jerome Bruner states, "A theory of instruction is
prescriptive in the sense that it sets forth rules concern-
ing the most effective way of achieving knowledge or skill.
By the same token, it provides a yardstick for criticizing
or evaluating any particular way of teaching or learning.
Prescriptive theorists . The educational philosopher
Harry Broudy contends that prescriptions for practice can
be yielded from empirical theories. Broudy states, "The
behavioral sciences in principle can provide theory that
could be 'applied' to problems of educational practice.
One well known example is the theory of operant condition-
ing which has been turned into a strategy of teaching;
another is John Dewey's description of the complete act
of thought.
Jerome Bruner, Toward a Theory of Instruction
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1967), p. 40.
^^Harry S. Broudy, "The Philosophical Foundations of
Educational Objectives," Educational Theory 20 (Winter 70):
3 .
20
It is apparent that Broudy is willing to generate
prescriptive assertions from descriptive theory. On the
other hand, Broudy does not feel that philosophy can be
classified with empirical theory. in fact, Broudy main-
tains that to attempt to prescribe from philosophy is to
misunderstand the role philosophy plays in educational
thought and practice. The role of philosophical theory
is to interpret and clarify objectives. The role of
philosophy for Broudy is an interpretive role. Other
disciplines that can be classified into the same interpre-
tative category as philosophy are history, political
science, and some forms of sociology.
The educational philosopher Joe Burnett feels that
if philosophical theory were to be used to entail prescrip-
tions, the theory must be consistent with the tested con-
ceptions of science. Burnett contends that this condition
must be satisfied if prescriptions were to be implied from
17
a philosophical theory. Burnett holds that, in general,
formal philosophies cannot be used to derive logical impli-
cations for educational theory and practice. Burnett does
have one qualification. He feels there is a possibility
^"^Joe R. Burnett, "Observations on the Logical Im-
plications of Philosophic Theory for Educational Theory and
Practice," Educational Theory 11 (April 1961): 70.
21
of logically deriving propositions from a philosophy if
the philosophy makes connections with previous ideas and
1
8
values. Other than this exception, Burnett asserts,
empirical theory must be used to derive prescriptions.
Probably one of the outstanding contemporary examples
of an attempt to convert empirical findings into prescrip-
tions for teaching is done with the research findings of
the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. The findings of
Piaget on the various stages of cognitive development are
currently being utilized to devise teaching strategies that
conform to the stages of development.
It should be pointed out that it is possible, al-
though it may not be acceptable to some philosophers, to
derive prescriptions from a philosophical theory that by
and large does not have what is considered an empirical
base. For example, this is done with a Jesuit education
v/here educational practices are, in the main, derived from
a value base.
Relevant to this point, the philosopher Israel
Scheffler contends Dewey's account of the process of in-
quiry appears to be descriptive. However, Scheffler argues
18 Ibid
. ,
p . 67
.
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it is "rather normative than descriptive."^^ Thus, Dewey
may be deriving prescriptions from normative assertions.
Dewey may be deriving guides to educational practice from
a value base.
Summary
Several significant issues have surfaced: (1) Pre-
scriptions can only be derived from empirical theory,
(2) The empirical can only be identified with the behavioral
sciences, (3) Prescriptions and descriptions are separate
and distinct from each other. Therefore, prescriptions
cannot be derived from descriptions. Prescriptions are
normative assertions. They represent a value, a preference
of what ought to be done. Values are separate from descrip-
tive facts. It is a violation of logic to derive prescrip-
tions from descriptive statements. Accordingly, there is
'
»
not any relationship between theory and practice. Theory
is one thing. Practice is another thing. Practice is
prescription. Theory is description.
^^Israel Scheffler, "Reflections on Educational Rele-
vance," in The Philosophy of Education , ed. R. S. Peters
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 78-79.
23
Dualism
The contention that prescriptions and descriptions are
separate and distinct is labeled dualism. Dualism is the
philosophical view that experience is composed of bifur-
cated entities. In a dualistic view, mind and matter,
fact and value, theory and practice, knowing and doing,
subject and object, the individual and society would be
viewed as being separate and distinct.
The seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes
represents the classic dualistic position. Descartes con-
tended that mind and matter were separate and distinct.
Mind was represented by thought. Matter was represented by
the body. The things which belonged to the physical world
of matter were external and objective. The things of the
mind were internal and subjective. There was an objective
20
world of facts. There was a subjective world of values.
Dualism Denied: The Critical Theory
of Jurgen Habermas
The contemporary German philosopher Jurgen Habermas
challenges all forms of dualism. Habermas challenges the
^^Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method; Meditations ,
trans. John Veitch (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 112-128.
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absolute distinction between empirical assertions and
value judgments. He challenges a dualistic view of theory
and practice.
Habermas contends that theory is very much related
to practice. Habermas perceives theory as having a criti-
cal function, and as having a fundamentally practical
interest to guide it. This practical interest is norma-
tive. For example, critical theory has a practical inter-
est in radically improving human existence.
Habermas contends that the practical tends to become
confused with the technical. He maintains that the tend-
ency of contemporary thought is to reduce all problems of
22
action to problems of technical control and manipulation.
Habermas maintains that this situation has come about
because of the separation of values from practical concerns.
However, for Habermas, practical questions are normative.
They are not technical. For example, the practical ques-
tion of "What ought I do" cannot be solved technically.
In the classroom, techniques of behavior modification are
technical. Nonetheless, the practical problem for the
^^Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social
and Political Theory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1976)
,
p. 180.
^“Ibid
. ,
p. 188
.
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teacher is "Towards what ends should a student's behavior
be modified?" This is a normative problem. In the view of
Habermas, the technical is not separated from the
normative
.
Habermas's position shows us that practical ques-
tions that cannot be framed in terms of technical problems
are not discussed very seriously, if at all. For example,
there may be qood reasons for building a nuclear plant.
There may be good reasons for not building it. However,
in the view of Habermas, the technical question of hov/
would be more readily addressed than the normative question
of why. By not addressing the why question, dualism re-
sults. Values are divorced from technical or scientific
questions
Campbell states that every practical problem is a
23problem in research. Habermas disagrees. He contends
that practical problems cannot be solved solely by research
efforts. A research problem tends to be viewed as a tech-
nical problem. Viewing a practical problem as a research
problem denies the normative aspects of problems.
The inquiry of research is empirical. Empirical
research, or descriptive theory, is limited in its critical
function. Empirical inquiry seeks to establish scientific
^^Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry , p. 398.
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laws and principles. It does not seek to engage in criti-
cal inquiry. Critical inquiry raises normative questions.
Empirical inquiry separates values from empiricism. When
this is done, Bernstein, in interpreting Habermas, points
out, "The relationship of theory to practice can now only
assert itself as the purposive rational application of
techniques assured by empirical science
Habermas would contend that many prescriptive
theorists uncritically adopt the results of empirical
research. In their zeal to derive prescriptions from
empirical theory, many prescriptive theorists do so with-
out consideration of the normative implications of their
efforts
.
Habermas contends that what is needed is a unity of
theory and practice so that practical questions can be
addressed in a normative rather than in a technical manner.
The unity of theory with practice will not tell us how to
precisely change the world. This would imply a positive
science. Theory cannot be reduced to such. The unity of
theory with practice will mean that the value implications
as well as the technical implications of practice would be
critically discussed.
25
^^Bernstein, Richard J. The Restructuring Of Social
And Political Theory . New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
197 6
,
p"! 187 .
^^Ibid., p. 219.
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Habermas feels that the present separation of theory
from practice has resulted in disinterested practitioners
applying scientific techniques devoid of consideration of
the value implications of their practice.
Dewey's Position on the Relationship
of Theory to Practice
D^ey p^ceived an intrinsic connection between
theory and practice. The significance of theory was in
its function as a guide to practice. Theory gave direction
to practice. Dewey thought that formal philosophical
theory could be used to guide practice. Dewey thought that
philosophical theory could be used to imply prescriptions.
Dewey said, "A philosophy of education, like any theory,
has to be stated in words, in symbols. But so far as it
is more than verbal it is a plan for conducting
education.
The significance of Dewey's position rests on the
premise that theories are revised in the light of experi-
ence. Dewey viewed theory experimentally. He perceived
theory as a set of hypotheses to be tested in experience.
This experimental orientation permeated Dewey's entire
26 Ibid
.
9 7
John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1938), p. 28.
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2 8philosophy. In fact, Dewey's theory can be labeled
experimental theory. This author contends that a justifi-
cation for deriving prescriptions from Dewey's philosophy
resides on the premise that the theory is experimental.
Prescriptions derivea from Dewey's philosophy are to be
i-0sted in experience. In this sense, Dewey perceived
philosophical theory as empirical theory. Through the
assertion that its ideas can be tested in experience,
philosophy is deemed empirical.
The educational philosopher D. B. Gowin states this
position quite succinctly. Gowin states, "It is often
thought that philosophy is not as objective as empirical
research. But if objectivity means what other persons
can corroborate, then objectivity can result from philo-
29
sophical discourse." Gowin 's point is that the princi-
ples of philosophy can conceivably be subjected to a public,
social test in experience.
Dewey was not a dualist. He did not separate theory
from practice. Dewey attacked dualism by maintaining that
there were practical elements and bearings already contained
^^John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York:
Capricorn Books, 1929), pp . 270-273.
^^Encyclopedia of Educational Research , 4th ed., s. v.
"Philosophy of Education," by D. B. Gowin.
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in theory. He said, "The argument that theoretical instruc-
tion is merely abstract and in the air unless students are
set at once to test and illustrate it by practice-teaching
of their own, overlooks the continuity of the classroom
mental activity with that of other normal experience
.
Dewey did not separate empirical assertions from
normative assertions. Dev/ey stated, "When all is said and
done in criticism of present social deficiencies, one may
well wonder whether the root difficulty does not lie in
the separation of natural and moral science." The abso-
lute distinctions between prescriptive assertions and
descriptive assertions are viewed by Dewey as remnants of
an archaic dualism. On this matter, P. L. Smith points out
that a statement such as, "Intelligence is demonstrated by
speed in calculation" is a prescriptive as well as a de-
scriptive statement. Smith asserts, "This statement
is not only describing but also prescribing how intelligence
3 3
ought to be viewed." The speed of calculation can be
30 . .
John Dewey, "The Relation of Theory to Practice in
Education," in John Dewey on Education , ed. Reginald D.
Archambault (New York: The Modern Library, 1964), p. 322.
^^John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston:
The Beacon Press, 1957), p. 173.
^^P. L. Smith, "On Creating and Using Standards," Edu -
cational Theory 28 (Winter 1978): 45.
33 Ibid
.
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measured empirically, but in doing so we are also saying
such a measurement is what we value to be a demonstration
of intelligence.
Dewey did not think behavioral science findings
could be directly converted into prescriptions for teaching.
Dewey said. Laws and facts, even when they are arrived at
in genuinely scientific shape, do not yield rules of prac-
^ • 1 . 3 4tree. Dewey did not discard research findings, nor did
he feel that they had no use. However, he did feel their
use was dependent upon the conditions of an experiential
setting. He felt that the research findings of a laboratory
environment were one thing, and the environment of a class-
room was another thing. In essence, empirical findings did
35
not prescribe a rigid set of procedures.
Dewey, like Habermas, had a critical perspective of
practice. Dewey was concerned about the normative implica-
tions of practice. He said, "Philosophy, thus, has a
double task: that of criticizing existing aims with re-
spect to the existing state of science . . . and inter-
preting the results of specialized science in their bearing
^"^John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education
(New York: Liveright, 1929), p. 28.
35 Ibid., p. 29.
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on future social endeavor. Dewey foresaw that the
objectives of science and the results of science had
ethical bearing on practice. He did not view the process,
nor the results of science, in a technological manner.
Finally
,
Dewey was aware that good teaching could be
done by persons who have never had any instruction in
either the theory or the practice of teaching. Dewey said:
We have here, I think, the explanation of the success
i
of some teachers who violate every law known to
and laid down by pedagogical science. They are
themselves so full of the spirit of inquiry, so
sensitive to every sign of its presence and absence
that no matter what they do, nor how they do, they
succeed in awakening and inspiring like alert and
intense mental activity in those with whom they
come in contact.
Dewey realized such a teacher was the exception and
not the rule. Dewey thought that it was more reasonable
to believe that a conscious reference to theory would
prove to be a valuable asset in teaching, and would indeed
be an effective tool for turning out good teachers. He be-
lieved that conscious reference to theory would help to
make practice more intelligible by allowing the assessment
3 8
of teaching behavior relative to a set of norms.
^^John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The
Free Press, 1944), p. 329.
^"^Dewey, "Relation of Theory to Practice," p. 330.
^^Ibid., p. 327.
CHAPTER III
JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY AND
THEORY OF INQUIRY
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate John
Dewey's theory of inquiry. Although there are always
appropriate sub-sections, Dewey's theory of inquiry can be
divided into four sections; his naturalism, his view of
logic as contrasted with traditional logic, his view of
experience, and his problem solving schema. The assumption
is made that if a teacher is open to learning about and
using Dewey's philosophy, then an understanding of these
four areas can provide the basis for developing teaching
strategies which conform to his theory.
Equally helpful to the teacher disposed towards
teaching inquiry from a Deweyan perspective will be a com-
parison between Dewey's pragmatism and the philosophy of
logical positivism. The author contends that often
teachers employ inquiry teaching strategies which have a
positivistic orientation rather than a Deweyan orientation.
Dewey's pragmatism is often confused with logical positivism.
Richard Bernstein points out, "It is still a popular myth.
32
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even among philosophers, that positivism was a tough-
minded variety of the more tender-minded and fuzzy
pragmatism.
To deal with this problem, comparative analysis is
used to ferret out the differences between logical posi-
tivism and Dewey's pragmatism. The endeavor is to bring
out the sharp differences between the two philosophies to
help assure that positivistic versions of inquiry are not
mistaken for Deweyan versions. On this matter, Bernstein
said, "What was then not clearly seen, and is today still
barely recognized, is the deep antagonisms betv;een logical
2positivism and pragmatism.
"
Dewey's Naturalism
The foundation of Dewey's theory of inquiry rests
upon a naturalistic continuum. The propensity towards
doing inquiry exists at birth, although is a most rudimentary
way. Dewey feels that it is natural for man to inquire.
Inquiry is as natural to man as his having opposite thumbs.
Dewey said, "Tendencies toward a reflective and truly logi-
cal activity are native to the mind, and they show themselves
^Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 168.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 169
.
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at an early period, since they are demanded by outer condi-
tions and stimulated by native curiosity."^
Our biological traits provide the conditions for
engaging in inquiry behavior. Man would be unable to
engage in inquiry without the use of his biological charac-
teristics. Dewey said,
It is obvious without argument that when men
inquire they employ their eyes and ears, their
hands and their brains. These organs, sensory,
motor, or central, are biological. Hence, al-
though biological operations are not sufficient
conditions of inquiry, they are necessary condi-
tions . ^
Man's biological traits continue with him throughout
his life. Humans do not pass through and then out of a
stage of biological development into a stage of intellec-
tual development. The biological impetus of inquiry con-
tinues with man as he grows and develops. Continuity and
stages of development are central themes in Dewey's
naturalism. Similarly, continuity and stages of develop-
ment are central themes in Dewey's educational philosophy.
Appropriately, teachers should consider the developmental
level of the learner. For example, algebra would not be
^Jchn Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1933), p. 83.
"^John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), p. 23.
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taught in the first grade. Ideas would be organized
according to the various levels of their complexity. in
short, learning material would be adapted to the develop-
The learner would not be
adapted to the material. Dewey also felt that as humans
developed and evolved from infancy to adolescence, the
opportunity for thinking more abstractly was enhanced.^
He said, "The mind at every stage of growth has its own
logic." He emphasized this point by saying, "The only way
in which a person can reach ability to make accurate defi-
nitions, penetrating classifications, and comprehensive
generalizations is by thinking alertly and carefully on
7his present level."
The implication is that teachers have given to them
pupils who are already in possession of the natural material
for developing skills of inquiry. Therefore, a task of the
teacher is to exploit this naturalism. One of the chal-
lenges of teaching, in Dewey's words, is, "The transforma-
tion of natural power into expert, tested power: the
transformation of more or less casual curiosity and sporadic
suggestion into attitudes of alert, cautious and
^Ibid
. , pp . 88-89
.
C
Dewey, How We Think , p. 83.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 84
.
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thorough inquiry."® Moreover, Dewey indicates that in
every period of growth from childhood to adulthood the
natural tendency to engage in inquiry is present.^
It should be pointed out that the natural processes
of inquiry are basically the same regardless of develop-
mental level. A baby forms a hypothesis in the same manner
as a scientist. The hypothesis developed by the baby and
the hypothesis developed by the scientist function to
guide inquiry. In essence, Dewey maintains there is not a
^iffs^rence of kind between the inquiry skills of a first
grader and a philosophy professor. The difference is one
of degree: the subject matter is more sophisticated; the
generalizations are more abstract.
Dewey's contention that inquiry has a naturalistic
foundation, and that human beings naturally possess it,
does not mean the process will always be effectively used.
Consequently, it is a task of the school to make students
more efficient in their inquiring . An emphasis on the
naturalistic foundation of inquiry has other ramifications.
It established inquiry as a natural phenomenon; therefore,
there is no natural reason why humans cannot do inquiry.
® Ibid
.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 88
.
^^Ibid., pp. 17-34.
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Naturalism also establishes an evolutionary-organic view
which suggests there are stages of development, and in-
struction should be matched to these stages.
Naturalism and values . Although exactly what Dewey meant
by naturalism is difficult to pin down, it can be said that
^^turalism io not exclusively a biological characteristic
of man. Dewey's naturalism has other significance. Dewey's
naturalism lays the foundation for a humanistic values
system, and it lays the foundation for Dewey's idealism.
It is through this idealism that Dewey's values were often
expressed. Dewey's idealism differs from traditional
notions of idealism. Dewey's idealism deals with the
natural world. The natural world is the world of human
experience. Traditional philosophical idealism deals with
a transcendent world. This world is an ideal world which
exists independently of human experience. Dewey was at
odds with philosophical idealism. He felt it turned its'
back on the world of human experience . On this point,
David Marcell says, "Yet despite his diatribes against
idealism as a metaphysic, Dewey consistently battled for
idealism in practical morality and ethics. Metaphysical
idealism, he felt, made such practical, experiential
^^John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York:
Capricorn Books, 1929), pp. 26-48.
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Idealism impossible It should be stated that naturalism
implies that notions of what constitutes goodness arise out
of human experience. In Abraham Kaplan's words,
Naturalism refers to the view that the ground of
values is something in human experience and of a
piece with everything else we experience—as
contrasted with supernatural grounds like a
divine coimandment, or with nonnatural grounds
like a unique quality of 'goodness' apprehended
by a distinctive 'moral intuition .' 13
Dewey thought that if man passively reclined and con-
templated the ideal good, he would be less likely to bring
it into the realm of human experience. Dewey thought that
if notions of the good were unchanging and transcended
man's natural existence, he did not have to develop ideas
of goodness from his experience. Dewey said:
The thought that the values which are unstable
and wavering in the world in which we live are
eternally secure in a higher realm (which reason
demonstrates but which we cannot experience)
,
that all the goods which are defeated here are
triumphant there, may give consolation to the
depressed. But it does not change the existen-
tial situation in the least. 1'^
12David W. Marcell, Progress and Pragmatism, James,
Dewey, Beard, and The American Idea of Progress (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 197.
^
^Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology
for Behavioral Science (Scranton: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1964), p. 389.
^^Dewey, The Quest for Certainty , p. 35.
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A practical idealism asserts that humans can act on
concrete experiential situations to bring about change.
By using inquiry to process experience, it is possible the
world could be made a better place in which to live. It
was Dewey s idealistic hope that the use of inquiry would
result in intelligent social beliefs. Dewey said,
If it is possible for persons to have their
beliefs formed on the ground of evidence, pro-
cured by systematic and competent inquiry,
nothing can be more disastrous socially than
that the great majority of persons should have
them formed by habit, accidents of circumstances,
propaganda, personal and class bias.^^
In sum, Dewey's ethical naturalism reflects a belief
in the corrigibility of human nature. It reflects a belief
in the potential goodness of man. It reflects a belief in
education as the vehicle for human betterment. Dewey's
words were, "I believe that education is the fundamental
1
6
method of social progress and reform." Consequently,
teaching strategies derived from Dewey's theory of inquiry
are expressions of a practical, naturalistic ethic.
Accordingly, if a person's existing value framework falls
within Dewey's naturalistic ethic, there will be a greater
^^John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1933), p. 90.
^^John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," The School Journal
54 (January 16, 1897): 77-80.
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likelihood for Dewey's theory of inquiry to be used as a
basis for deriving inquiry teaching strategies.
Dewey's Logic Compared to
Traditional Logic
The second major category to be considered in the
explication of Dewey's theory of inquiry is his view of
logic. The author maintains that an understanding of the
^s^tral principles of traditional logic can be an important
factor to an understanding of Dewey's logic. In fact,
Dewey felt his logic was a marked improvement upon the tra-
ditional logic of rationalism.
Rationalism . The rationalistic view maintains that truth
is established through the use of reasoning. The power of
reason is exalted. Deductive reasoning, in particular, is
celebrated. Reasoning is used to derive rational conclu-
sions. For example, if A is greater than B, then B is
less than A. This is a rational conclusion. It is a logi-
cal necessity, or as sometimes called, it is a necessary
truth. In traditional logic, valid conclusions are based on
sound reasoning from first principles. Dewey remarked, "The
idea of reason as the power which intuitively apprehends
41
a priori ultimate first principles persists in logical
. 1 7philosophy .
"
In the rationalistic view, ideas are ideals. However,
ideals are not naturalistic conceptions. Rationalistic
ideals transcend human experience. Inquiry is not used
upon experience to determine them. On the contrary, ideals
exist as givens already determined. For example, the idea
of justice is determined. As a rationalistic ideal, justice
is invariant. Its meaning is not contingent upon experi-
ence. The meaning of justice is fixed and absolute.
In education. Dr. Robert M. Hutchins personified the
rationalistic position. Hutchins believed that "the good,
the true, and the beautiful" were to be found in the
world's best books and that the best books were the
classics. A good education consisted in knowledge of the
classics. The good was determined. The good was fixed
regardless of experiential circumstances. A classical edu-
cation was good in the past, and it is equally good in the
present.
The function of symbols in traditional logic . Traditional
logic manipulates symbols so that rational assertions may
be constructed. Therefore, the syllogism is an essential
1
7
Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry , p. 10.
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tool of traditional logic. A syllogism is nothing more
than the manipulation of language to achieve a valid con-
clusion. For example, if all men are mortal, and John is
a man, John is mortal.
tional logic also deals with the symbolic mean-
ings of language. Symbolic meanings imply other symbolic
meanings. For example, smoke implies fire. Smoke implies
friction. The fire and the friction exist by logical
implication. Where there is smoke, there is fire. Fire
is represented by smoke. The words or symbols provide no
1
8
evidence of fire. The words are propositions. With
propositions, implications are made. With propositions,
the existence of fire can be implied. The existence of
fire does not have to be observed.
Dewey’s logic . Dewey's logic is based upon experience. It
is based upon making inferences from experience. Dewey
said, "There is danger that two things as logically unlike
19
as inference and implication will be confused." Implica-
tions are made from propositions. Inferences are made from
the events of experience. Therefore, an inference depends
upon an actual existential event. For example, we can
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 52
.
Ibid
. ,
p . 54
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infer that at the rate a fire is burning, it will reach
our house. We cannot imply this. Dewey felt that tradi-
tional logic was based on symbols and implications from the
symbols. His logic is based on experience and inferences
from the experience.
The function of symbols in Dewey ' s logic . In Dewey's logic,
symbols stand for inferences or concepts that are to be
tested in experience to determine their validity. Symbols
are used to represent thoughts or ideas. Symbols are used
to represent possible courses of action. Symbolizations
have reference to procedural features of inquiry. Proposi-
tions have an instrumental character: they lead to action.
The instrumental character of symbols . H. S. Thayer
provides a useful example of the instrumental character of
symbols. Thayer states.
Suppose we are inquiring into the problem of
building a house. In the course of our inquiry,
we make use of the concept, hammers and nails
are necessary for the construction of wooden
houses. This concept allows us to act. It aids
in the actual building of the house. 20
Dewey illustrated the instrumental character of sym-
bols with a commonplace occurrence. A person is walking
along. Suddenly he feels cool air. He looks up at the sky.
^^H. S. Thayer, The Logic of Pragmatism (New York: The
Humanities Press, 1962), p. 127.
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He sees dark clouds, and soon he has an idea of rain. It
is not yet raining, but through symbolization the idea of
rain is represented. Rain is possible. The possibility
is represented in the symbolization.^^
The possibility of rain suggests certain intelligent
actions. We can procure our raincoats. We can procure our
umbrellas. These suggestions are in the form of proposi-
tions which have an instrumental character. A relationship
is established between dark clouds and cool air to formulate
an idea of the possibility of rain.
Confusing words for experience . Dewey strongly criticized
traditional logic for its contention that words were more
important than experience. He said, "The whole classic
tradition down to our day has continued to hold a slighting
view of experience." Appropriately, it should be emphasized
that words are not the experience. The tendency to confuse
words for experience results in the acceptance of verbal
statements for ideas. Consequently, in the classroom, a
student writing down the idea is deemed to have conceptual-
ized it. It was Dewey's hope that ideas would be opera-
tionalized in experience. For example, the concept, "People
may put different meanings on the same word," should be
^^Dewey, How We Think, pp. 9-10.
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operationalized. Students could operationalize the concept
by giving examples of it. The examples, of course, refer
to an actual experience.
Dewey felt the symbolization of the concept tended
to become more important than the experience of the actual
operation of the concept. He said.
Words, the counters for ideals, are, however,
easily taken for ideas. And in just the degree
in which mental activity is separated from ac-
tive concern with the world, from doing some-
thing and connecting the doing with what is
undergone, words, symbols, come to take the
place of ideas.
Teachers tended to forget the concept, in its symbolic
form, stood for or pointed to the actual operation of doing.
For example, consider the concept, "Numerals are written
symbols for quantity." Students might operationalize
this concept by constructing their own symbol system. There
is nothing innate about symbolizing the idea of sevenness
by 7. Writing the concept, "Numerals are written symbols
for quantity," is a symbolic representation of the concept,
but it is not the concept. The symbolization of the con-
cept should not be confused with the actual operation of the
concept
.
"^John Dewey, Democracy and' Education (New York: The
Free Press, 1944), p. 144.
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—role of deductive reasoning in Dewey's logic. It
should be pointed out that Dewey's logic does not abandon
the traditional logic of deductive reasoning. In fact,
Dewey warns against the educational reformer who carries
his objection too far against deduction. Dewey said,
^ statement of a general principle may properly come
at the beginning, provided it is used to challenge atten-
tion and not to close inquiry." In like manner, Dewey is
critical of teachers who accept students' inductive infer-
ences without testing and amplification.^^
In Dewey's logic, deduction works with induction.
St^ents ind^t ideais,, and use deduction to test them. It
was Dewey '
s Jio^e that the examples students gave would
2 6help them move into new facts and ideas. On the other
hand, Dewey did not think this would be done if students
mechanically gave examples and illustrations of the
concept. He said, ^
Too often the student and teacher are contented
with a series of somewhat perfunctory examples
and illustrations, and the student is not forced
to carry the principle that he has formulated
over into further cases of his own experience.
Insofar, the principle is inert and dead; it /
does not move into new facts or ideas. ^7
O "5
Dewey, How V7e Think
,
p. 187.
^"^Ibid. "^Ibid., p. 186.
26 27Ibid
. ,
p . 187
.
Ibid
.
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Dewey's conception of meaning , with traditional logic,
meaning is innate. Meaning is absolute, meaning is
unchanging. With Dewey's logic, meaning is subject to
change. However, meaning is not subjective. Meaning has
an existential quality. It exists for others. Dewey said.
The particular existential sound or mark that stands for
dog or justice in different cultures is arbitrary or con-
ventional in the sense that although it has causes there
2 8are no reasons for it." Thus, the word dog does not
make a dog a dog. What makes a dog a dog is a common
acceptance of what is understood to be the case in experi-
ence. Meaning is, thus, social.
Some Teaching Implications
of Dewey's Logic
Dewey's view of logic, as contrasted with the tradi-
tional logic, offers several suggestions for teaching
strategies
.
First, teaching strategies would include provisions
for the testing of concepts. The testing of ideas is of
paramount importance in Dewey's logic.
Second, learning activities that help to point out
the difference beti>7een the word and the concept would be
^^Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry , p. 47.
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Third, the teacher would emphasize experience as the
base from which to derive and test ideas. In short, the
teacher would be aware of the difference between an appeal
to experience and an appeal to reason in the rationalistic
sense of reason.
,
the teacher would not accept language alone
as evidence of students' conceptualizing. Students would
have to demonstrate concept behavior.
Dewey's Views of Experience
This writer believes the most critical element in
Dewey's theory of inquiry to be Dewey's notions of experi-
ence. In fact, Richard Bernstein maintains that basic to
an understanding of Dewey's definition of inquiry is an un-
29derstanding of Dewey's notions of experience. To extend
Bernstein's point, teaching strategies that make use of
Dewey's theory of inquiry would be severely limited without
an understanding of his ideas of experience. And as we
shall see, Dewey's notion of problem solving is dependent
upon situations being converted into reflective experiences.
29Bernstein, John Dewev , p. 103.
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John Dewey believed that we learned from experience.
All experience did not result in knowledge, but it was from
experience we gained, however grudgingly, what knowledge
we did have. Dewey said, "I assume that amid all uncer-
tainties there is one permanent frame of reference: namely,
the organic connection between education and personal
experience
.
After years of wrestling with a definition of experi-
ence, Dewey came to the conclusion that experience has
only one "single definite use: that namely of calling
attention to the fact that Existence has organism and
environment as its aspects, and cannot be identified with
• 31
either as an independent isolate."
Experience as transaction . Dewey views experience as a
transaction between self and environment. The constituents
of experience are the self and the environment mutually
acting on each other. John Wynne stated, "Experience is
always transitive having both a subject and an object.
The individual is born, lives, and dies in the midst of
persons and things . His continuous transactions with them
on
John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
Collier Books, 1938), p. 25.
^^John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the
Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 294.
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constitut0 th© str6am of his ©xpsr iencs .
"
In his earlier writings, Dewey used the word inter-
action. George Geiger points out the word interaction
"assumes that some things have indeed been set apart, the
problem now being to put them together again. Henry
poirits out, "Transaction connotes the mutual and
the reciprocal Darnell Rucker points out, "V7hat had
long been viewed as disparate ultimate entities, mind and
world, self and environment, became two factors in a
process, necessarily related through the process, neither
having any existence independent of the other. George
Herbert Mead offered, "The appearance of an organism
capable of digesting grass brought into existence grass as
3 6food." Dewey and Bentley asked, "How can we have a
principle without an agent, or a supply without a
32John P. Wynne, Philosophy of Education from the
Standpoint of the Transaction Theory (Farmville, Virginia:
Longwood College Foundation, 1971), p. 6.
33George R. Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective (New York
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958), p. 16.
34Henry Miller, "Transaction: Dewey's Last Contribu-
tion to the Theory of Learning," Educational Theory 13
(Jan. 1963): 13.
^^Darnell Rucker, The Chicago Pragmatists (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 28.
36-., . -Ibid
.
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37demand." "Borrower cannot borrow without lender to lend,
nor lender lend without borrower to borrow. The exist-
ence of one thing is dependent upon the existence of
another
.
Dewey and Bentley pointed out, "We can, of course,
detach any portion of a transaction that we wish, and
secure provisional descriptions and partial reports. But
all this must be subject to the wider observation of the
39full process." The complexity of experience requires a
transactional view. Ittelson and Kilpatrick offer the
following example.
Consider our problem as that of understanding a
baseball batter fully and in all his complexity.
It is immediately apparent that the baseball
batter does not exist independent of the
pitcher. We cannot have a batter without a
pitcher. It is true that someone can throw a
ball up in the air and hit it with a bat, but
his relationship to the batter in the baseball
game is very slight. Similarly, there is no
pitcher without a batter. The pitcher in the
bull-pen is by no means the same as the pitcher
in the game. But providing a pitcher for a
batter is still not enough for us to be able
to define and study our batter. The batter we
are interested in does not exist outside of a
baseball game, so that in order to study him
completely we need not only pitcher, but
catcher, fielders, teammates, officials, fans,
and the rules of the game. Our batter, as we
Dewey and Bentley, Knowing And The Knov/n , p, 134.
Ibid
. ,
p . 133
.
Ibid
.
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see him in this complex transaction, simply
does not exist anywhere else independent of the
transaction. The batter is what he is because
of the baseball game in which he participates
and, in turn, the baseball game itself is what
it is because of the batter. Each one owes its
existence to the fact of active participation
with and through the other. If we change either
one, we change the other.^^
A transactional view of experience has practical,
pedagogical implications. The learner is active. The
learner is important. He is a dynamic part of the transac-
tion. For instance, while reading a book a transaction
occurs between reader and author. The reader makes judg-
ments. The reader must decide which of his experiences
are relevant to the story. In making such judgments, the
reader looks for signals in the story that refer to his
experience. Without the transaction between reader and
author, the reader would be forced to deny his experience,
he would be merely imprinted with the author's experience.
What there is in the book to know is dependent upon the
reader reading it. The reading of the book is a trans-
action. Dewey said:
Even if sounds on the moon, assuming the
necessary physical and physiological waves,
match Yankee Doodle in intensity, pitch, and
timbre, they are not Yankee Doodle by "intrinsic
^^W. H. Ittelson, F. A. Kilpatrick, Human Behavior from
the Transactional Point of View (Hanover, New Hampshire.
Institute for Associated Research, 1952) , p. 134.
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nature," in the twentieth century, whatever they
might have been thought to be in the Dark Ages,
or may perhaps be thought to be today by echo-istic survivals of those days; they need action
if they are to yankeedoodle at all. 41
Israel Scheffler points out the significance of a
transactional view. Scheffler states, "The process of
learning from experience was an active process for the prag-
matist. The mind was conceived neither as a deep well of
necessary truths nor as a blank slate upon which experience
,,4 2
writes .
"
In a transactional view of experience, the environment
does not simply, but forcefully, impress knowledge upon the
individual. The learner is active. He reconstructs his
experience: he develops ideas from his experience. Through
a reconstruction of experience, the learner attempts to
understand his present experience in the light of his past
experiences. Ideas gained from previous experiences are
used to solve problems in our present experience or to help
us understand and make sense out of present experience.
Through reconstruction, the meaning of our present experience
is enriched; our perceptions are increased. We are able to
"^^Dewey and Bentley, Knowing And The Known , p. 134.
^^Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, An Intro -
duction to Epistemology and Education (Glenview, Illinois:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 5.
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put more things together. In sum, reconstruction is that
aspect of Dewey’s theory that asserts that previous ideas
gained through the use of inquiry upon past experience can
now be transferred to our present experience. Transference
is important. It is a form of reconstruction. If in the
past we have learned how to fix a flat tire and our tire
is now flat, we should be able to fix it. If in the past
we have learned that people generally smile when they are
happy, a smile on a face makes sense to us. If the smile
is deceptive, we have to construct a new concept. In any
event, we are still searching for meaning.
The important point to be made is that inquiry is the
method of deriving meaning from experience. Although it
has become identified as such, inquiry is not merely a
method of problem solving. Inquiry is more extensive than
a logic of problem solving. Inquiry is the method of
processing experience. A person can be reflective with
his experience even when not necessarily confronted with
a specific or a pressing problem.
Richard Bernstein asserts, "There are two frequent
misinterpretations of Dewey that can be easily corrected
here: the claim that according to Dewey we only think when
we must; and that the only occasion for thinking is the
55
occurrence of a practical dif f iculty
. The implication
for teachers is that students can be reflective about their
experiences and not necessarily be confronted with a
problem.
—
—having and the knowing experience
. Dewey specified two
phases of experience. There was the having, and there was
the knowing experience. The having experience was the
nonreflective experience. The nonref lective experience
made up the better part of experience. Bernstein said,
"When Dewey speaks of ' nonref lective ' or ' noncognitive
'
experiences, he means any type of experience in which
knowing or inquiry is not the primary concern." Dewey
wrote
;
Consideration of method may suitably begin with
the contrast between gross, macroscopic, crude
subject matters in primary experience and the
refined, derived objects of reflection. The
distinction is one between what is experienced
as the result of a minimum of incidental reflec-
tion and what is experienced in consequence of
continued and regulated reflective inquiry. For
derived and refined products are experienced
only because of the intervention of systematic
thinking.
^^Bernstein, John Dewey
,
p. 105.
"^"^Ibid., pp. 61-62.
"^^John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1926), pp. 3-4.
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Having an experience lays the groundwork for a know-
ing experience. The having experience is the immediate
experience. Using our vision, we can have the immediate
experience of color . From having this immediate experi-
ence, the groundwork for shifting into a knowing experience
is established: we can, if we desire, investigate the
^^ture of color. From investigation, we can learn about
optical physics. The having experience has the potential
to be transformed into a knowing experience. The use of
inquiry transforms the having experience into a knowing
experience
.
Having an experience is important, but merely having
an experience does not result in knowing. For example, a
person can have the experience of playing chess. The mere
experience of chess playing is not enough to develop chess
skills. It is only when there is reflection upon the chess
playing experience that there will be developed chess skills.
It could be observed that a certain opening move
allowed the bishops to be developed. A relationship is de-
veloped which states that in beginning a game of chess it
is wise to make certain moves to develop the bishops. The
ability to make this relationship is an essential part of
inquiry. If this were just a having experience, inquiry
would not be used, and relationships would not be developed.
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In a having experience, chess pieces would be pushed, and
the next time one played he would begin the game arbitrarily
he would not make an opening that would allow the bishops
to be developed. There would not be any concept developed
that would allow for continuity from one experience to the
other. A concept can be transferable. It can be used
again in a new but similar experience, such as another
chess game. Obviously, the principle of continuity can
only be undertaken when there are concepts to transfer or
when there has been a knowing experience. In fact, a de-
veloped concept is evidence that the experience has been a
knowing experience.
Dewey makes two important points. First, he asserts
that the development of concepts is an indication that
reflection has occurred and that there is knowledge.
Second, he equates knowing with doing. For instance,
knowing the rules of chess is not the same as knowing how
to play chess skillfully. Obviously, knowing the rules of
chess is knowledge of a kind. However, in the final analy-
sis, to quote Dewey, "There is no such thing as genuine
knowledge and fruitful understanding except as the off-
spring of doing.
4 6
Dewey, Democracy and Education , p. 275.
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Dewey essentially takes the epistemological position
that knowledge can be defined in terms of using inquiry
upon the having experience. His writings strongly reflect
this position. Examination of his writings finds that he
has said, "Knowledge is to be defined in terms of
.,47inquiry
.
Any statement that is or can be made about a
knower
,
self, mind, or subject—or about a known
thing, an object, or a cosmos—must so far as we
are concerned, be made on the basis, and in terms,
of aspects of event which inquiry, as itself a
cosmic event, finds taking place. 48
Dewey's view of experience contrasted with the orthodox
view . Dewey's contention that knowledge can be defined in
terms of using inquiry upon experience is a departure from
the orthodox view of experience. The philosopher John
Locke represents the orthodox view. To Locke, the mind was
conceived as a blank slate upon which experience wrote.
The experience itself results in knowing. However, Dewey
feels the orthodox view is an inadequate account of exper-
ience. For example, take the simple situation of an optical
illusion. Upon immediate apprehension, a stick immersed in
a glass of water appears to be bent. We cannot know whether
"^^Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , p. 21.
^^Dewey and Bentley, Knowing And The Known , p. 121.
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the stick is bent merely by having the experience of
perceiving it. In fact, if we went by the perceptual
experience alone, we would think the stick was bent.
Dewey held that knowledge was not due to experience
alone. He felt our knowledge was mediated. We did some-
thing to experience. In our example, we take the stick out
of the water
. In doing so
,
we find out the stick is not
bent. Dewey hoped we would take an active role in struc-
turing our experience. He hoped we would process our ex-
perience. If we were not actively involved with our ex-
perience, Locke would be correct; having an experience
would result in knowledge.
Abraham Kaplan adds further clarification. He points
out, "There is an empiricist tradition, from Hume through
Mill to Russell, in which a distinction is made between
'hard' and 'soft' data, according to whether they are pure-
49
ly observational or contain an inferential element."
Kaplan further points out, "Nietzsche's label for this
philosophical doctrine is not, I think, unjust; he called
50
it 'the dogma of immaculate perception.'"
49
50
Kaplan
,
Ibid
.
The Conduct of Inquiry , P- 131 .
60
Essentially, in the orthodox empirical tradition,
people do nothing but perceive a factual condition. It is
the facts that give us truth. Schwab points out, "This
conception rests on a premise very like that of rationalism,
that facts carry their own self-evidence guarantee and
convey the same conclusion to all men."^^ Educationally,
this theory results in a desire to "rub the learner's nose
52
iri the facts. The philosopher Bertrand Russell personi-
fied the orthodox, empirical position. Russell once
asserted, "Nevertheless it is plain, also, that the truth
or falsehood of a given judgment depends in no way upon the
person judging, but solely upon the facts about which he
judges .
"
In Dewey's view, a human being is actively making
inferences from his experiences. An inference is mediated
knowledge; it is not immediate knowledge. Making an infer-
ence is a vital function of inquiry. We are able to go
beyond information to make a warranted assertion. We make
inferences from what we experience. Data arouses sugges-
tions. Dewey pointed out, "But the suggestions run beyond
Joseph J. Schwab, "The Impossible Role of the Teacher
in Progressive Education," The School Review 67 (Summer
1959) ; 141.
52-rK-^Ibid
.
^^Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (New York:
Simon and Shuster, 1966), p. 149.
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what IS, as yet, actually given in experience. They fore-
cast possible results, things to do, not facts (things
already done)
. Inference is always an invasion of the
unknown, a leap from the known.
In the orthodox view of experience, apprehension of
a thing is confused with comprehension of it. In Dewey’s
view, apprehending an object does not constitute all there
is to know about it. To explain, we can directly perceive
that water is water. We are at the recognition level of
experience. There are many levels of experience. We use
inquiry to realize these many levels. We can go beyond the
recognition of water. Further investigation may result in
revealing the chemical properties of water. This would be
a comprehension, an understanding, of water. Dewey would
be wont to call the perceptual level of experience a know-
ing experience. Apprehending the appearance of the water
is not a separate experience from understanding its chemi-
cal makeup. Apprehending is a phase of experience. As
George Geiger points out, "Experience is an affair of
55having as well as of knowing." We are able to go from
one phase to the other, from having to knowing. Dewey is
5 4Dewey, Democracy and Education , p. 158.
55Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective
,
p. 20.
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essentially saying there is more to an experience than
meets the eye
.
Dewey did not deny that there was some thinking in
all experiences. He did feel, however, that knowing or
inquiry was not the primary concern of all experiences.
On this matter, Bernstein states:
Anyone who recognizes the differences between an
experiencing of quenching thirst where the per-
ception of water is a mere incident and an
experience of water where knowledge of what is,
is the controlling interest; or between the enjoy-
ment of social converse among friends and a study
deliberately made of the character of the partici-
pants; between aesthetic appreciation of a picture
and an examination by a connoisseur to establish
the artist recognizes the difference between non-
cognitive or nonref lective experiences and experi-
ences in which knowledge is primary.
H. S. Thayer contends Dewey did not break with the
traditional empirical view of experience. Thayer feels
57
Dewey overhauled it. Thayer points out that the result
was, "Instead of experience being the stuff from which
ideas are derived, it became a way in which ideas have a
5 8
function and their significance is elicited." 'In short,
experience became experimental."^^ Dewey's overhauling oi.
56 Bernstein, John Dewey, p. 62.
S. Thayer, Meaning and Action, A Study of American
Pragmatism (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973), p. 247.
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experience resulted in a shift from the antecedent view of
experience to a consequential view. The consequences of
ideas become of greater interest than their origins. Thus,
ideas become instruments for experimentation. The interest
is in what will happen to experience if we use our ideas to
undertake this or that course of action.
Inquiry is the experimental method of experience. We
use the method to construct an idea from experience. We
use the method to test the significance of an idea in experi-
ence. However, we do not experiment merely to find out the
truth or falsity of an idea. We also test ideas to find
out what they could mean in experience. We test to find out
their consequences, their social significance.
Dewey felt the origins of ideas were the focus of
the orthodox view of experience. In Dewey's view of experi-
ence, ideas are not revered because they have glorious
antecedents or are lovable traditions. We examine ideas in
terms of their actual consequences in experience. We are
not anchored into past experiences. People are free to
experiment with experience and try new ideas. Significantly,
whenever we are dealing with consequences we are dealing
with possibilities. Possibilities imply the opportunity
to experiment.
64
An illustration from the area of law is used to
demonstrate the experimental view of experience as it con-
trasts with the more orthodox view. in 1894, a man was
arrested on the charge of employing women more than eight
hours a day. An Illinois statute provided that females
working more than eight hours a day was illegal. The
Supreme Court of Illinois ruled the statute unconstitutional.
P^scedent and formal reasoning were invoked. Liberty of
contract was deemed an important right. It was argued that
this statute was a violation of that right. Therefore, this
statute was unconstitutional.
Fifteen years passed. The same man was arrested for
violating a similar law, a ten hour work law. The same
argument of liberty of contract was raised. This time,
however, there was a different judge with a different view
of experience. Rather than consider antecedents, this
judge turned to the consequences of experience. The con-
sequences of a ten hour work day indicated the health of
women to be placed in peril by the long hours of work.
Therefore, this judge decided liberty of contract would
have to be redefined in the light of new experience. Limits
60
on the right of contract could be set.
^^Columbia Associates in Philosophy, An Introduction
to Reflective Thinking (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1923), pp. 281-299.
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Dewey does not assert that we should experiment for
experiment's sake. Random activity is not inquiry. In-
quiry had to be purposeful. Dewey pointed out.
To run against a hard and painful stone was notitself an act of knowing. However, if runninginto a hard and painful thing was an outcome
predicted after one inspected data and constructed
a hypothesis, then the hardness and painful bruise
which defined the thing as stone also constituted
it emphatically as an object of knowledge.^!
In essence, when we experiment we have a purpose in mind.
We have ideas to guide us
.
The orthodox view holds that experience can tell us
what is and what has been. It cannot tell us what ought to
be.^^ Therefore, prescriptions are impossible. Dewey, of
course, rejected the dualism between the is and the ought.
Dewey's position was that inferences can be made from experi-
ence to aid us in deciding what to do. We can use experi-
ence experimentally. We can test our inferences against
experience. We can test what we ought to do against experi-
ence. The experimental method was not separated from
normative behavior. Whenever humans were experimental, they
were engaged in moral behavior. They were maintaining they
ought to try this, or they ought to try that.
^^John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1916), p. 15.
6 2Bernstein, John Dewey, p. 71.
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This value issue will be addressed in more detail in
the comparison of positivism with pragmatism. For present
purposes, it is important to point out that it was Dewey's
hope that human beings would develop an experimental atti-
tude towards experience. It was Dewey's hope that the
experimental attitude would be developed in our schools.
The experimental attitude provides the normative basis for
the cognitive skills of inquiry. The skills of classify-
ing and the skills of inferencing work in conjunction with
attitudes of openness and tolerance. The skills and the
values of inquiry function together. The cognitive skills
of inquiry and the values of inquiry are not separate and
distinct modes of experience.
Teaching Implications of Dewey's
Views of Experience
Based on Dewey's views of experience, several points
pertinent to the development of teaching strategies can be
made. First, transference can become an integral part of
teaching. Teachers could allow for a reconstruction of
students' experiences. Teachers could provide opportunities
for students to transfer ideas into the classroom that have
been developed from previous experiences. This could be
accomplished by asking students to give examples from their
experience of the concepts being studied in class.
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Second, by having students develop and test concepts,
a having experience could be transformed into a knowing
experience. For example, if a group of seventh graders are
preparing to go on a field trip to a glass factory, inquiry
could be used to help them make sense out of the experi-
ence. Concepts for the students to test could be provided
by the teacher. In addition, the teacher could ask the
students to induct their own concepts from the experience.
The field trip experience would be more than a having
experience. If used in conjunction with inquiry, a field
trip can become a knowing experience. If inquiry is not
used, reflection is left to chance, and it is assumed that
the experience itself will lead to knowing.
Third, teachers would work on the distinction between
observing and inferring. They would work on students
developing the ability to construct inferences from an
observation or a set of observations. The notion of the
individual actively reconstructing his experiences, and
making inferences, is paramount.
Fourth, keeping the inquiry value of openness in
mind, teachers would work on students developing the
ability to realize that inferences may need to be revised
on the basis of additional observations. Strategies to
develop an experimental attitude would, therefore, be
implemented
.
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Finally, knowing can occur outside of school. The
ubiquity of experience is recognized. However, a student
would not receive credits for merely having an experience
Evidence of the development and the use of concepts would
have to be established.
Dewey's Problem Solving Schema
Dewey's problem solving schema could be included
within the section pertaining to his views of logic. His
problem solving schema constituted the central part of his
logic of inquiry
. Given that the problem solving process
was such an important part of Dewey's logic, it is con-
sidered in its own right. Dewey's problem solving notions
helped to establish his epistemology.
Dewey gave two definitions of inquiry. In one defi-
nition, inquiry was simply equated with knowing. In the
other definition, his mos t,,,famous one, inquiry and knowing
—
were put in the context of a problem situation. In this
definition, Dewey said, \|^Inquiry is the controlled or
MIC
directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into
..i,«...so determinate in its constituent distinctions
and relations as to convert the elements of the original
63Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, p. 295.
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si tuation into a unified whole. Dewey gave an example
of his definition;
Suppose you are walking where there is no regular
path. As long as everything goes smoothly, youdo not have to think about your walking; your
already formed habit takes care of it. Suddenly
you find a ditch in your way. You think you willjump it (supposition, plan); but to make sure,
you survey it with your eyes (observation)
,
and
you find that it is pretty wide and that the bank
on the other side is slippery (facts, data). You
then wonder if the ditch may not be narrower some-
where else (idea)
,
and you look up and down the
stream (observation)
,
to see how matters stand
(test of idea by observation)
. You do not find any
good place and so are thrown back upon forming a
new plan. As you are casting about, you discover
a log (fact again) . You ask yourself whether you
could not haul that to the ditch and get it across
the ditch to use as a bridge (idea again)
. You
judge that idea is worth trying, and so you get the
log and manage to put it in place and walk across
(test and confirmation by overt action).
Ultimately, it was Dewey's hope that we would develop
an experimental attitude, that we would actively seek
problems. Our problems would not have to be practical ones
staring us in the face. On the contrary, our intellectual
curiosity would lead us to problems which in turn would lead
us to use inquiry to solve them. 66
fi 4
Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry , pp. 104-105.
^^Dewey, How We Think
,
p. 105.
66Bernstein, John Dewey, p. 105.
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Peirce’s contribution
. Charles S. Peirce, Dewey's former
teacher, should be credited with presenting the problem
situation as the catalyst to thought. Peirce said, "The
irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of
belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry, though it
must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt
6 7designation. Peirce thought that, among other things,
man is a biological organism. All organisms seek a state
of equilibrium. Problems upset this state; therefore,
problems must be resolved. The best method of resolution
is the method of inquiry.
In Peirce's view, truth would be settled by a com-
munity of inquirers. It would be agreed upon by all those
who investigate the problem. In such a view, the public
testing of ideas is all important. On this matter,
Frederick A. Olafson states, "Inquiry offers its tentative
conclusions for general evaluation, and it is accepted that
the milieu of experience in which this evaluation is to be
6 8
carried out is that of everyman." Truth for Peirce was
^"^Charles S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," in
Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings , ed. Philip P. Wiener
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), pp. 99-100.
^^Frederick A. Olafson, "The School and Society:
Reflections on John Dewey's Philosophy of Education," in
New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey , ed. Steven M.
Cahn (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New
England, 1977), p. 180.
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objective. it was objective in the sense that ideas are
open to public verification and testing.
Dewey was in accord with Peirce's view of truth. In
fact, he said.
The best definition of truth from the logical
standpoint which is known to me is that of
Peirce: The opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate
is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented by this opinion is the real.o^
The phases of thinking behavior . If the method of inguiry
is used to solve a problem, various phases of cognitive
behavior may be represented. According to Dewey, these
phases were:
(1) suggestions, in which the mind leaps forward
to a possible solution; (2) an intellectualiza-
tion of the difficulty or perplexity that has been
felt (directly experienced) into a problem to be
solved, a question for which the answer must be
sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after another
as a leading idea or hypothesis, to initiate and
guide observation and other operations in collection
of factual material; (4) the mental elaboration of
the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition
(reasoning, in the sense in which reasoning is a
part, not the whole, of inference); and (5) testing
the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action.
These phases were not lock step. The process could
be entered at phase three or phase four . Dewey warned about
falling into a lock step approach. He said, "The five
fi 9
Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , p. 345.
7 0
Dewey, How We Think
,
p. 107
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phases, terminals, or functions of thought do not follow
one another in set order. William C. Merwin points out
Dewey did not try to establish a fixed series of
consecutive steps involved in thinking. Rather
than learn a formula for thinking, he proffered
that a learner should develop the 'intellectual
tact and sensitiveness' to solve problems by
inquiring constantly in the classroom. ”72
Merwin states, "This process, consisting of five phases
(suggestion, intellectualization
, hypothesis, reasoning
and action)
,
was to be employed as a classroom teaching
7 Tmethod as well as an instructional goal."
Bernstein stated about Dewey's method of problem
solving
,
It is descriptive insofar as it is concerned
with the ways in which men actually do inquire;
it is normative because the aim is to isolate,
appraise and evaluate those norms and standards
that are most successful in achieving warranted
knowledge claims.''^
The problem situation . An experiential situation is inde-
terminate. We are doubtful because the situation is
doubtful. Problems are not solely the creation of the
private mental events of an inner self. Therefore, to
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 115
.
"^^William C. Merwin, "The Inquiry Method," in Handbook
on Contemporary Education , ed. Steven E. Goodman (New York
R. R. Bowker Company, 1976), p. 388.
74Bernstein, John Dewey, p. 102.
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solve a problem, an experiential situation must be consid-
ered. Without a consideration of the experiential situation,
the problem cannot be solved. Problems are viewed trans-
actionally. There is a problem situation and there is a
human being. Dewey put it this way: "The farmer will not
get the grain unless he plants and tills. The tilling
and the planting are not private mental events. They are
events performed in experience by the farmer.
George Geiger points out, "Problems can be of all
^i^ds and occur in all dimensions." ^ For example, investi-
gation into why some cities grow industrially and others do
not can be considered a problem. There is an indeterminate
situation. It is not determined why one city grows and the
other does not.
The problem situation and the teacher . It should be
pointed out that a problem situation will not automatically
stimulate thinking. Merely giving students a problem and
hoping for the best is not the best procedure for teaching
inquiry. Some students may choose to solve the problem by
flipping a coin. Accordingly, an important task for the
7 5
Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , p. 107.
7 fi
Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective , p. 63.
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teacher would be to teach problem solving skills and
attitudes
.
Dewey realized that it was important for students
to formulate their own problems. On the other hand, he
recognized that schools do give problems to students.
Dewey stated, "The giving of problems, the putting of
questions, the assigning of tasks, the magnifying of
difficulties, is a large part of school work."”^”^ Dewey's
concern was that teachers would discriminate between genu“
ine and simulated problems. Dewey postulated two guidelines
to assist teachers: (1) Does the problem have a relation
to the student's personal experience? (2) Will the problem
7 8lead to inference and its testing?
In consequence, problem situations can be of the stu-
dent's formulation, or they can be of the teacher's. The
connection to experience rather than the origination of the
problem is what is of significance. It should also be
pointed out that Dewey felt problems naturally suggested
themselves from outside of the school experience. These
problems could be used by the teacher as appropriate sub-
jects for inquiry. In short, community problems are fit
subjects for inquiry.
7 7
Dewey, Democracy and Education , pp. 154-155.
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Warranted assertions
. The solving of a problem results in
knowledge or belief. Dewey preferred the term "warranted
assertion" to knowledge or belief. He stated, "It is free
from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves
reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion.
In Dewey's view, ideas are tested to determine if they
qualify as warranted assertions. There are, of course,
problem situations in which it is impossible to test an
idea for its warranted assertability . When confronted with
such a situation, Dewey's advice was to be aware of those
8 0beliefs that rest on tested evidence and those that do not.
The objectives of problem solving . Although solving prob-
lems was important, Dewey did not think the ends of inquiry
consisted in solving problems. Inquiry was more than
solving problems. Inquiry was a means to the nobler ends
of human growth. Dewey said, "Growth itself is the only
8
1
moral end." H. S. Thayer states.
Inquiry is a sign and condition of human growth.
It was not surprising that Dewey should find in
inquiry the possibilities for a genuine
religious outlook—one wanting only in imagina-
tive projection of the essentially communal
"^^Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry , p. 9.
^^Dewey, How We Think , p. 98.
^^John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston:
The Beacon Press, 1959), p. 177.
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^and its premium on socially
Possible Teaching Implications
Several points can be made pertinent to problem solv-
ing and teaching strategies. First, there would be teaching
strategies by which students would be taught the logic of
problem solving. However, it would follow that the logic
of problem solving would not have to be taught sequentially.
Second, it is within Dewey's theory for the teacher to give
a student a problem. However, the problem should relate
to the student's experience. Third, strategies to have
students develop an awareness of problems should be devel-
oped. Obviously, the first phase in problem solving is
becoming aware that there is a problem. Fourth, teachers
could develop teaching strategies that would have students
develop the ability to distinguish beliefs that rest on
tested evidence and those that do not. The social-public
nature of inquiry could be stressed. Fifth, teachers
could have students work on developing attitudes of inquiry
,
especially viewing ideas as warranted assertions rather than
as dogmatic assertions.
^^Thayer, Meaning and Action , p. 142.
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Logical Positivism and Dewey's
Pragmatism
The purpose of this next section is to compare logical
positivism with Dewey's pragmatism. Both are empirical
philosophies. Simply put, both contend that knowledge
comes from experience. Richard Bernstein even contends that
positivism found a congenial home in America to a large ex-
tent because of the influence of John Dewey. Bernstein
feels that this philosophical companionship resulted in a
blurring of the significant differences between the two
8 3philosophies. Bernstein contends that the idea that
positivism was not only compatible with Dewey's pragmatism
but a further development of his position still obtains.
Consequently, positivistic conceptions of inquiry are often
confused as being Deweyan. Accordingly, this section will
focus on the major differences between positivism and Dewey's
pragmatism.
Logical Positivism
Contemporary logical positivism is identified with a
group of philosophers who gathered in Vienna in the 1920 's.
They were labeled the Vienna Circle. Harry Broudy points
out
:
^^Bernstein, John Dewey, pp. 168-169.
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circle dedicated itself to (a) showing that
all human knowledge is built up out of the data
of experience, especially sense experience,
Cb) that propositions that could not be reduced
to statements about observable items in experience
were both literally and figuratively nonsense,
i.e. meaningless, and (c) philosophy that talked
about nonobservables was to be dismissed as dis-
guised expressions of wishes rather than as
description of anything. 84
Richard Bernstein states.
Basically, the positivist temper recognizes only
two models for legitimate knowledge: the
empirical or natural sciences, and the formal
disciplines such as logic and mathematics. Any-
thing which cannot be reduced to these, or cannot
satisfy the severe standards set by these disci-
plines, is to be viewed with suspicion. 85
Positivism Compared with Dewey's
Pragmatism
Transaction . Positivists claim there is an objective world
existing independently of human transaction. Dewey would
agree there is an external world of "brute facts" given
through experience. However, he feels this world does not
have much character or meaning independent of human trans-
action. On this matter, Dewey and Bentley said;
p A
Harry S. Broudy, "The Philosophical Foundations of
Educational Objectives," Educational Theory 20 (Winter 70);
15.
8 5 Richard J. Bernstein,
Political Theory (New York:
1976)
,
p. 5.
The Restructuring of Social and
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
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A real world* that has no knower to know it, sofar as human inquiry is concerned (and this is allthat concerns us), has just about the same 'reality*that has the palace that in Xanadu Kubla Kahndecreed. (That, indeed, has had its reality, butit was not a reality beyond poetry, but in and
of it.) A knower without anything to know has
perhaps even less claim to reality than that.^^
Positivism does not have a transactional view of
experience. It clings to a dualistic view of experience.
is assumed to be an objective world with an already
formed character. Dewey, of course, viewed experience as
a transaction. This so called objective world is but one
part of the process of transaction. The other part, a human
being, is equally significant. This significance is denied
by positivism.
Reductionism . The positivist takes a reductionist view of
experience. The abstract can be reduced, and should be re-
duced, to the concrete. The abstract can be reduced to
the immediate world around us. Hans Reichenbach points out
that the immediate world of the positivist can be reduced
to a world of nothing but sense data. For example, a stove
can be reduced to hot. Hot is sense data. A flower can be
86Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known , p. 136.
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reduced to blue. Blue is sense data.®^ The positivist
contends that if ideas cannot be reduced to their basic
elements, they have no basis in an objective world. The
implication is that abstractions are without existence, or
at the very least are nonsensical.
Dewey, on the other hand, was not a reductionist. He
felt that abstractions were real. Abstractions had exist-
ence. Notions of justice were just as real as hot stoves.
For the pragmatist, experience consisted of irreducible, but
objective, abstractions. Reichenbach felt that a belief in
objective abstractions that are irreducible distinguished
8 8the pragmatist from the positivist.
Objective abstractions . Dewey was critical of positivism's
refusal to deal with objective abstractions. He said about
positivism, "Its logic has no recognized place for hypothe-
ses which at a given time outrun the scope of already deter-
mined 'facts,' and which, indeed, may not be capable of
verification at the time or of direct factual verification
at any time.
^"^Hans Reichenbach, "Dewey's Theory of Science," in
Philosophy of John Dewey , ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (Menasha,
Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1939), pp • 160-163.
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 162
.
^^Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , p. 519.
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Abstract does not mean without existence. The educa-
tional philosopher P. L. Smith asks, "Are there irreducible
abstract qualities of nature that are not creations of mind,
or mere figments of the imagination, but instead represent
objective realities?"^^ Objective abstractions are natural.
They are derived from the experiences of human transactions.
They are abstractions in that they cannot be ultimately
reduced with any meaning to sense data, or reduced with any
meaning apart from their relationship to other experiential
things. For example, to have meaning, hot is related to
stove. Blue is related to flower. Justice is related to
society. Abstractions are objective in that they cannot be
isolated from human experience. The connections are made
in this world, and the connections made do not have meaning
outside of human experience.
Things are not given in experience as isolated ele-
ments. Dewey said, "Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness,
courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not
private possessions of a person. They are working adapta-
91
tions of personal capacities with environing forces."
^
^Philip L. Smith, Sources of Progressive Thought in
American Education (Columbus, Ohio: By the Author, The
Ohio State University, 1977), p. 105.
^^John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: The
Modern Library, 1957), p. 19.
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The ideas mentioned represent objective abstractions.
They exist in human experience. In Dewey's view, they have
a base in an objective-natural world. Ideas are very real.
Ideas have existence in human experience. Unlike the posi-
tivist, Dewey felt abstractions do have an irreducible
existence in human experience. These abstractions are objec-
tive. They affect the lives of human beings. They guide
human behavior. Objective abstractions have consequences
in experience.
A comparison of the purpose of inquiry . Positivism was
interested in using the method of inquiry to establish the
truth or the falsity of an idea. Dewey felt that positivism
had a tendency to view ideas as either true or false. He
said, "Popular positivism, in spite of its claims to be
strictly scientific, has been in some respects the heir of
an older metaphysical view which attributed to ideas
9 2inherent truth-falsity properties." Dewey felt that the
method of inquiry could be used to establish the warranted
assertability of an idea. Dewey did not view ideas as
being either true or false. Warranted assertability sug-
gested that the truth of an idea was a probable and a
tentative truth, not an inherent truth. This required a
^^Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , p. 519.
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different temperament from positivism. in this respect,
there is a significant attitudinal difference between posi-
tivism and Dewey's pragmatism.
Positivism maintains that since the objective world
is already formed, inquiry is to be used to discover the
laws and principles of the objective world. On the other
hand, the pragmatist is not primarily interested in inquiry
to acquire knowledge about an objective world. Pragmatism
is interested in the part inquiry plays in developing the
capacity for man to think, and for man to experience human
94
emotions. Dewey felt that the method of inquiry had value
implications as well as epistemological implications.
Dewey felt that there was a normative basis to inquiry.
Positivism does not have this view of inquiry.
The Issue of Values
Dewey thought that the subject matter of scientific
judgments and the subject matter of moral judgments were
the same. He said, "I hold that one and the same method
is to be used in determination of physical judgment and the
9 3Smith, Sources of Progressive Thought , p. 98.
94 Ibid
. ,
p . 100
.
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value-judgments of morals. Positivism does not hold to
this view. Robert E. Mason points out, "The positivists
and analysts resist moral imposition sanctified by the
claim to absolute truth but they, it seems, would allow a
naked power struggle to determine moral standards, denying
the possibility of rational establishment of grounds of
acceptability.
Dewey believed values had an experiential base and
were subject to the process of inquiry. Ideas of good, or
of bad, are directly experienced. Positivism contends that
values are subjective. People, therefore, can believe
anything they want as long as they are logical and do not
contradict themselves. Values are outside the domain of
inquiry. Mason says about the logical positivists, "In
their overwhelming concern about clarity, internal consist-
ency, and logical rigor, they place the ethical outside the
97domain of intellectual method." Unlike Dewey's pragma-
tism, positivism does not have an empirical conception of
95John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value," in
The Philosophy of John Dewey
,
ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp
(Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company,
1939)
,
p. 583 .
q c
Robert E. Mason, "Grounds of Acceptable Theory in
Education," Studies in Philosophy and Education 1 (Jan. 61)
51.
97 Ibid
. ,
p . 50
.
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morality. Moral positions can be logical, that is not
contradictory, but they cannot be empirical. Dewey, of
course, felt the idea of justice to be just as objective
as the idea of gravity. The meaning of gravity is hammered
out of human experience. Conceptions of justice are
hammered out of human experience.
The Influence of Positivism
The influence of positivism has been felt in many
areas. It is Richard Bernstein's contention that positi-
vism dominates the thinking of what he terms "mainstream
social science." Bernstein says.
By 'mainstream social scientists' I mean those
who conceive of their discipline as one that
differs in degree and not in kind from the well
established natural sciences, and who are con-
vinced that the greatest success is to be found in
emulating, modifying, and adapting techniques
that have proven successful in our scientific
understanding of nature. ^8
If positivism has penetrated the social sciences, it
is reasonable to believe that positivism has infiltrated edu-
cation and has influenced attem.pts at inquiry teaching. In
fact, carrying the positivistic banner into education has
been one of the leading contemporary advocates of inquiry
teaching, Edwin Fenton. In the mid-1960's Fenton gained
^^Bernstein, The Restructuring, p. xv.
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prominence for developing social studies projects with an
emphasis on inquiry thinking skills. In discussing these
projects/ Fenton sounds much like Bernstein's description
of the mainstream social scientist. Fenton states, "The
social studies projects devote much of their efforts to
teaching the rules by which social scientists verify,
99
modify, or reject hypotheses."
M. J. Max van Manen states that Fenton's position is
similar to the other leading models of inquiry teaching.
He feels that the concept of inquiry teaching should have a
broader epistemological base than is currently practiced.
He is suggesting that Fenton is not positivistic enough,
and he is suggesting that the leading models of inquiry
teaching are not positivistic enough. Present inquiry
models, in Max van Manen 's estimation, need to more ade-
quately reflect "the true nature and inquiry patterns of
the everyday practices of scientists
The important point to be stressed is that the posi-
tivistic scientific model rather than the extensive philo-
sophical orientation of John Dewey became the model for in-
quiry. In fact, Bernstein feels positivism is one of the.
^^Edwin Fenton, The New Social Studies (New York:
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 32.
J. Max van Manen, "An Exploration of ^^Alterna-
tive Research Orientations in Social Education," Theory
and Research in Social Education 3 (December 1975) . o.
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if not the, dominant philosophies in Western intellectual
circles. if such is the case, we could expect to con-
tinue to have positivistic influences on inquiry teaching
and we could expect to have even less attention paid to the
philosophy of John Dewey.
f^i^risss to Fenton, he was aware of Dewey's analy-
sis of the process of reflective thinking. The problem is
that Fenton does not view the process of reflective think-
ing in the context of Dewey's total philosophy. His model
of inquiry is a positivistic one. If Dewey's five phases
of reflective thinking are taken in isolation from the rest
of his philosophy, we have a positivistic position. Dewey,
obviously, would agree with an emphasis on scientific
method as the best procedure to knowing and to learning.
On the other hand, Dewey linked the method of inquiry to
other related philosophical concerns, such as a view of
experience, notions of value, and the role of deduction.
Summary and Teaching Implications
In essence, positivism does not have a transactional
view of experience. Positivism clings to a dualistic viev/
of experience. In a positivistic view of experience, a
101Bernstein, John Dewey , pp. 167-172.
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separation is made between the problem and the student's
experience. The problem and the student's experience are
vievjed as distinct entities
. Connecting a problem to the
experience of a student is not a concern of positivism. In
fact, there is not any philosophical basis to do so. The
experience of the learner is deemed to be not as important
as the facts of the objective world which exists independ-
ently of the learner's experience.
In Dewey's view, attempts are made by the teacher to
connect problems to the experiences of students. The prin-
ciple of transaction is not neglected. Students are pro-
vided the opportunity to perceive how problem.s take on
meaning when they become part of the student's experience.
Students are, thus, provided the opportunity to identify
with problems.
In Dewey's view, abstractions would not be reduced.
Abstractions affect our lives. Ideas have consequences.
Teachers would, therefore, provide opportunities for stu-
dents to ponder the consequences of ideas. It would be
important for students to develop an appreciation of the
significance of the function of abstractions in human
experience
.
A positivist educator is a reductionist. Measurement
is important. Measurement is quantitative. Intelligence
89
and aptitude can be measured. Therefore, the person who
scores high on an admission test to law school should be
admitted. In contrast, Dewey would take into consideration
other traits less measurable. For example, perseverance
and a sense of justice are objective abstractions worthy
of consideration. They are not, however, quantifiable
units of measurement.
The Philosophy and the Theory
Synthesized
We can say that inquiry is not a logic. It is a
theory and a philosophy that includes a logic. It is used
to solve problems. It is used to process experience. It
is used to derive meaning. It is used to develop concepts.
It is used to test concepts. It is an outlook on life. It
has its own moral code. It includes being open and public,
viewing life experimentally, not being absolutist. Inquiry
is an attitude that does not accept a closed authority.
It is an attitude that is willing to change with new data.
It is an attitude that stresses cooperation and sharing.
It is an attitude that seeks and respects evidence, but is
aware that abstractions are as real as the stones on the
ground, and just as natural.
Inquiry is a view of the use of the scientific method
that respects symbolic thought. It realizes that thinking
90
is made possible by the use of symbols, but the symbols
are concept statements that need to be tested in experience.
Inquiry views the method of science as not being confined
to a particular discipline such as biology or physics
.
Inquiry is a general method of knowing and making sense out
of experience that cuts across all boundaries of disciplines.
It is a way of trying to view social problems personally.
It is a philosophy that acknowledges both society and the
individual. The individual structures his experience, but
what is structured is subject to a public test. With the
use of inquiry, distinctions are not made between the is
and the ought. The is and the ought of life do not belong
to two different worlds. In essence, the inquiry tempera-
ment does not accept a dualistic view of life. The many
facets of our experience transact with each other. Our job
is to make connections of one experience to another experi-
ence, and thereby, as human beings, to grow and expand.
,
Finally, inquiry is prescriptive as well as descrip-
tive. Steven Cahn points out that this distinguishes
Dewey from contemporary philosophy. In this regard, Cahn
quotes the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle. Ryle said,
"I have no teaching tricks or pedagogic maxims to impart
91
to you, and I should not impart them to you if I had any."^^^
Cahn points out that Dewey would not agree with Ryle's
position. Cahn states, "Dewey after all, believed that one
of philosophy's crucial tasks is 'the search for values to
be secured and shared by all,' and that is precisely the
search eschewed by the makers of the British philosophical
1 4.- ,.103revolution
.
102Steven Cahn, "Introduction," in New Studies in the
Philosophy of John Dewey
,
ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover, New
Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1977), p. ix.
103 Ibid.
CHAPTER I V
TWO SIGNIFICANT PAST ATTEMPTS TO
IMPLEMENT DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY
This chapter has two purposes. The first purpose is
to discuss the "project method" of William Kilpatrick.
The "project method" offers an opportunity to critique a
conception of Dewey's ideas in a form that was intended to
be used, and in fact was used, for educational practice.
An awareness of the distortions of Dewey that resulted, and
the reasons for the distortions, can conceivably be of bene-
fit in helping to avoid repeating the same mistakes in
future attempts to relate Dewey's ideas to practice.
The second purpose of this chapter is to discuss the
Laboratory School of the University of Chicago, the Dewey
School. The purpose is to illustrate a valid use of
Dewey's ideas in school situations.
The Project Method of Kilpatrick
William Heard Kilpatrick was a professor of education
at Teachers College, Columbia University, from 1918 to
1938. The educational historian Lawrence Cremin said,
"More than any other Kilpatrick has been acclaimed over the
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years as the great interpreter and popularizer of Dewey's
theories."^ It should be noted that it was Kilpatrick's
conception of Dewey that was popularized. One of the
vehicles Kilpatrick used to popularize his conception of
Dewey's ideas was the "project merhod."
The project method" received its beginnings through
an essay that Kilpatrick wrote and Teachers College pub-
lished in 1918. Over 60,000 reprints were distributed over
the next twenty-five years. The essay brought Kilpatrick
not only national fame, but international fame as well.^
The purposeful act . The "project method" set the purposeful
act of the child as the most significant part of the learn-
ing process. Purposeful activity meant nothing more than
that learning activities should be consonant with the
child’s ov7n goals. Kilpatrick put it this way, "Suppose a
girl made a dress. If she did in hearty fashion purpose to
make the dress, if she planned it, if she mads it herself,
then I should say the instance is that of a typical project.
We have in it a wholehearted purposeful act carried on amid
^Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School ,
Proqressivism in Am.erican Education (New York: Vintage
Books, 1964), p. 215.
‘Ibid., pp. 216-220.
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social surroundings.^
Kilpatrick specified four types of projects, or pur-
poseful acts. The first type of project's purpose was of
an external nature. The student might build a boat,
present a play, or write a letter. The second type of
project was to enjoy some aesthetic experience. The stu-
dent might listen to a story or listen to music. The
third type of project was problem solving. The student
might attempt to ascertain how New York outgrew Philadel-
phia. In the fourth type of project, the purpose was to
develop a skill such as a foreign language. In referring
to type three, that of the problem, Kilpatrick states,
"The steps that have been used are those of the Dewey
4
analysis of thought."
The project, or the purposeful act, was the result of
children's interests. Kilpatrick identified interest with
project. Kilpatrick did not think there was any tension be
tween the interests of society and the interests of the
child. He said, "There is no necessary conflict in kind be
tween the social demands and the child's interests."^ Kil-
patrick thought that if students plan their own work, set
^William Heard Kilpatrick, "The Project Method,"
Teachers College Bulletin 3 (October 1918) : 5.
^ Ibid
. , p . 17
.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 12 .
95
their own goals, and achieve their own education, it would
be because they were free to follow their interests. Kil-
P^trick said. How many children at the close of a course
decisively shut the book and say, 'Thank gracious, I am
through with that! ' How many people get an education and
yet hate books and hate to think.
Some forty years later, in explaining the background
for his "project method," Kilpatrick gave this perspective:
I thought of the project method as expanding the
use of 'purposeful activity' in the classroom. In
expanding this use of purposeful activity into the
school, I used the phrase 'purpose, plan, execute,
and judge.' My idea was that the class would agree
upon a purpose to pursue. They would then plan how
to carry out the purpose, next execute the plan, and
in the end judge the results of what they had done
and decide whether or not they had succeeded. If
the project was judged to be successful, they de-
cided v;hat to do next. In this way I sought to
expand the use of 'purpose, plan, execute, and
judge . '
7
Kilpatrick thought that whole-hearted purposeful
activity would be the central point of education. The '
important consideration was that the purposes and plans
were those of the student, not of the teacher. On this
point, Kilpatrick was once asked, "Could the teacher supply
the plan?" It was explained to Kilpatrick, "Take a boy
planting corn for example; think of the waste of land and
^Ibid
. ,
p . 11
"^William Heard Kilpatrick, "In Retrospect at Ninety,
Studies in Philosophy and Education 1 (Nov. 20 , 1961) : 14
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fertilizer and effort. Science has worked out better plans
than a boy can make." Kilpatrick answered, "I think it
depends on what you seek. If you wish corn, give the boy
the plan. But if you wish boy rather than corn, that is,
if you wish to educate the boy to think and plan for
himself, then let him make his own plans."®
Kilpatrick advocated a child-centered approach to
learning. Kis project method is synonymous with the child-
centered approach."' The educational philosopher Boyd Bode
said, "Whether a given task or understanding is a project
or not is determined by the pupil's attitude toward it."^°
The pedagogical banner of the child-centered school epito-
mized Kilpatrick's position: "freedom, not restraint,"
"pupil initiative, not teacher initiative," "the active,
not the passive school," and "child interest.
Kilpatrick was essentially maintaining that if the
child was to learn best, the child was to follow his
interests. The concept of interest greatly influenced
Q
Cremin, The Transformation of the School
,
p. 218.
Q
Ernest E. Bayles, Democratic Educational Theory (New
York; Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 236.
^^Boyd H. Bode, Modern Educational Theories (New York:
Vintage Books, 1927), pp. 142-143.
^^Bayles, Democratic Educational Theory , p. 238.
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Kilpatrick. Interest was a Herbartian concept. The
Herbartians were interested in child development, and in
the child's use of interest in learning. The Herbartian
movement was at its greatest from the late 1890 's to the
12early 1900 's. The leading Herbartians were Charles A.
McMurry, his brother, Frank, and Dr. Charles DeGarmo. In
fact, Charles A. McMurry wrote a book titled Teaching by
Projects
.
Accordingly, it may be that the concept of interest,
as used by Kilpatrick, took on more of a Herbartian orienta-
tion than a Deweyan. Kilpatrick studied Dewey's book.
Interest as Related to Will
,
under Dr. DeGarmo. Kilpatrick
13
stated, "It had great effect on me." It was unclear
exactly what had great effect on Kilpatrick: studying
Dewey's book, or studying it under the Herbartian, DeGarmo.
Interestingly, the course that Kilpatrick eventually taught
at Teachers College was the Herbartian course. Kilpatrick
said, "I soon dropped the title 'Herbert and Froebel' and
14
ultimately called the course 'Foundations of Method.'"
In contrast, Dewey was also influenced by Herbartian
ideas. However, Dewey worked out his own distinctive
^^Arthur G. Wirth, John Dewev as Educator (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 90-91.
^^Kilpatrick, "In Retrospect," p. 147.
14 Ibid
. ,
p . 148
.
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orientation and criticism of the Herbartian concept of
interest. Wirth states about Dewey, "He also found the
Herbartian concept of interest faulty. The basic weakness
in Herbartian psychology is its habit of giving ideas a
kind of existence of their own.""^®
Interestingly, the idea for project methods can be
traced to agricultural education at the high school level.
Since many pupils lived on farms, there could be home
projects. The pupil's projects took the form of growing
17crops, caring for animals and the like. Bayles implied
the term was borrowed from vocational education without
1
8
much thought and analysis on Kilpatrick's part.
Kilpatrick had many disciples. Cremin states, "In
all he taught some 35,000 students from every state in the
Union at a time when Teachers College was training a sub-
stantial percentage of the articulate leaders of American
19Education." The sheer number of students may have made
clarification of problems individual students were having
impossible to do.
1 s
wirth, Dewey as Educator , p. 91.
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 92.
^^Bode, Modern Educational Theories , pp. 142-143.
^^Bayles, Democratic Educational Theories , p. 237.
^^Cremin, The Transformation of the School, p. 220.
99
Differences Between Kilpatrick and Dewev
To one with a superficial acquaintance with Dewey's
philosophy
,
it would appear that there are no crucial
^iffs^snces between Kilpatrick and Dewey. However/ as the
education historian Lawrence A. Creinin has pointed out/
There are differences with Dewey that becoine crucial.
In accord with Cremin is the educational philosopher
Ernest Bayles. Bayles asserted:
It is our contention that the faults which are
laid/ whether rightly or wrongly/ at the door of
Progressivism are not justifiably attributable
either to Dewey or to his philosophy/ but instead
primarily to lack of clarity on certain crucial
matters which has characterized the writings of
William Heard Kilpatrick/ particularly those which
appeared during the high tide of Progressivism.
It was Kilpatrick who introduced the 'project
method' into elementary education. It is Kilpatrick
whom we seemingly must credit with 'pupil pur-
posing/ pupil planning/ pupil executing/ pupil
judging/ ' even though one of his most eminent
students/ Ellsworth Collings/ may have been a
bit more enthusiastic and a bit less circumspect
in its use. And it was Kilpatrick who was dubbed
in an authorized biography as "Trail Blazer in
Education." And what trail did he blaze if not
that of Progressivism?21
A significant difference between Kilpatrick and Dewey
was that Dewey rejected an exclusively child-centered ap-
proach to education. As Cremin offers/ it was Kilpatrick who
^^Ibid /
. / p . 219 .
^^BayleS/ Democratic Educational Theory / p. 237.
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shifted the balance of Dewey's pedagogical paradigm to-
wards the child. in such a shift, the role of the
teacher is greatly diminished. Dewey, of course, was
skeptical of any approach in v/hich the classroom teacher
was asked to default on his role of educational leader. In
fact, when it comes to suggesting projects, Dewey felt that
the teacher has not only the right but the duty to suggest
activity, and to show__that thsrs need not be any
fear of adult
-imposition provided ..the teacher_knows children
a s well as subject^ " Wirth points out that Dewey had
criticisms about the overly permissive excesses of the
child-centered approach, but Wirth states, "In the main,
however, ha muted these, perhaps because he wanted to avoid
adding strength to the heavy attacks constantly made on the
..24progressive pioneers.
Dewey was also concerned about the short span of the
projects. Dewey understood that interest could be fleeting.
He knew interest could be momentary. On this point, he
said, "It is possible to find problems and projects that
2 2Cremin, The Transformation of the Schools , p. 220.
23
John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science
of Education," in Dewey on Education , ed . Martin S.
Dworkin (New York: Teachers College Press, 1959), p. 124.
^^Wirth, Dewey as Educator , p. 282.
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come within the scope and capacities of the experience of
the learner and which have a sufficiently long span so
that they raise new questions, introduce new and related
undertakings and create a demand for fresh knowledge
Criticisms by Teachers
There were classroom teachers who were critical of
the "project method." Alice C. Lowengrund, a teacher at
Girls' High School Philadelphia, was critical of the empha-
sis on the child-centered approach. She felt this conception
had negative consequences in practice. She said:
Many teachers fail in project teaching because,
in an effort to let children do their own pur-
posing, they let them purpose unwisely; or, in
letting the pupils plan they permit much dilly-
dallying, they have much done that is valueless,
or tend to stress the product and not the educa-
tion; or in the judging process they fail to build
up standards and generalizations that will be of
value later.
Florence Sweeney, a high school teacher in Detroit,
criticized those who identified Dewey's philosophy as
being nothing more but projects. Sweeney said, "To many
teacher, administrators, and lay people, Dewey's educa-
tional philosophy has been interpreted as an 'activity
^^John Dewey, "The Way Out of Educational Confusion,"
in John Dewey on Education , ed . Reginald D. Archambault
(New York: The Modern Library, 1964), p. 423.
^^Alice C. Lowengrund, "A Critical Evaluation of the
Project Method," The Journal of Educational Method 7 (March
1928): 276-277.
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program' or as 'projects,'" Sweeney was critical of
projects being ends in themselves. She said, "Experience
projects are not ends in themselves but are the means by
which we offer young people opportunities for reflective
thought." Finally, Sweeney was critical that the projects
emphasized an extreme form of individualism. She stated.
The heart and core of Dewey are in the development of a
socially responsible adult, not a rank individualist,"^"^
The "project method" resulted in some strange class-
room practices. The most poignant example was the teacher
who taught Latin by having students carve busts of Roman
o q
statesmen out of huge bars of Ivory Soap.
Boyd Bode ' s Criticisms of
the Project Method
More than Dewey, it was Boyd Bode who offered the
most detailed and analytical criticisms of Kilpatrick's
"project method." Bode was a professor of education from
1921 to 1944 at Ohio State University. Cremin says, "In
the last analysis it may well be that Bode ' s work more
closely resem.bled the spirit and temper of Dewey's, while
Kilpatrick's in seeking to make Dewey's ideas manageable
27Florence Sweeney, "Learning by Doing," Saturday
Review of Literature
,
October 22, 1949, p. 14.
^^William M. French, America's Educational Tradition
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath & Company, 1964),
p. 139.
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for mass consumption by the teaching profession, ended
by transforming them into versions quite different from
the originals
Bode felt the "project method" violated notions of
experience
. It made too much out of the immediate or the
having experience. Bode said, "Perhaps children may learn
a great deal about numbers from running a play store or
bank, but this alone does not give them the insight into
the mathematics that they need to have."^° Bode was con-
cerned that the "project method" left a lot to incidential
learning
.
Bode felt Kilpatrick was unclear. Bode said, "The
term "project method" has become a name for a conglomeration
of ideas and not for a definite guiding principle . Bode
felt that there was confusion with Kilpatrick's definition
of method as "wholeheartedly purposeful activity." Bode
said, "On this basis the project method in teaching means
any procedure that arouses interests and so directs
activity. The definition just given lays down no principle
of procedure, and still less does it designate a specific
device. If wholehearted purposeful activity can be called
^^Cremin, The Transformation of the School , p. 221.
o n
Bode, Modern Educational Theories , p. 150.
31 Ibid
.
,
p . 151
.
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a method, it is only because the term method is taken in
a very 'broad sense.'"
Bode felt that Kilpatrick's lack of clarity resulted
in contradictions. He points out that Kilpatrick states
the teacher cannot purpose. On the other hand, Kilpatrick
thinks that there are certain basics such as reading and
arithmetic in which, if need be, we should use compulsion
.
Bode felt Kilpatrick sentimentalized the child. He
felt Kilpatrick had a mystical faith in a process of inner
development which required nothing from the environment
34
except to be left alone. Bode said, "But as Dewey re-
marks, thinking requires suggestions and the child must
get his suggestions from somewhere other than the recesses
of his inner consciousness."^^ Kilpatrick is denying
transaction. He is denying that there can be a teacher
involved in the learning process. The function of the
teacher is to give guidance and direction. Bode feels the
"project method" evades this function.
Bode criticized Kilpatrick's position of allowing the
Dupil to determine his own curriculum. Bode said, "The
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 157-158.
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 160-161.
Ibid
. ,
p . 163
.
^^Ibid.
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leaning of Kilpatrick's position is clearly toward letting
the pupil determine his own curriculum. in the case of
mathematics, 'some of the pupils, particularly the more
mathem.atically inclined, will, from time to time, put the
pieces together and form wholes more or less complete.
Later some will specialize in the subject.' Apparently,
those who do not do so are to be let alone.
Bode was not alone in his views. Paul Arthur Schlipp
warned that we should be careful not to equate Dewey with
the distortions of Kilpatrick. Bayles issued the same
38
warning
.
Kilpatrick's Distortions of
Dewey's Ideas
The distortions of Dewey can be summarized as
follows
:
(1) The child-centered view. This view tended to
be dualistic. It denied there was a society that the child
transacted with. In response to this one progressive
educator wrote, "During the years we have been engrossed in
the fostering and developing of child-centered schools, we
^^Ibid., p. 165.
^"^Paul Arthur Schlipp, "Dewey on Educational Ap-
praisals," Studies in Philosophy and Education 5 (Winter
66-67) : 180 .
^^Bayles, Democratic Educational Theories , p. 240.
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have viewed our task as though the child and the school
existed in a vacuum. We have been blind to the fact that
children's growth depends upon the society in which they
grow.
(2) The view of experience. The having experience
was celebrated. The hope was that learning may be inci-
dental. The cliche that what we know "could be caught
^^hher than taught" became dominant. Kilpatrick had more
of the traditional empirical view of experience. He had
less of a transactional view.
(3) The view of interest. Interest was considered
apart from purpose. However, interest without purpose can
result in random activity. The interest level was not
always one that led itself to duration or depth.
(4) The view of the teacher's role. The teacher
was reduced to a very passive role. However, Dewey thought
otherwise. He thought the teacher played a very active and
vital role in the classroom. The teacher could make sug-
gestions and assert leadership. Dewey said, "Guidance
given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupil's intel-
..4 0
ligence is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it.
^^Allen Hickerson, "Right, Left, or Neutral," Progres -
sive Education 9 (1932): 276.
^^John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
Collier Books, 1938), p. 71.
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(5) The view of problem solving. Problem solving
was too individualistic. The Peircean notion of coopera-
tive social inquiry was neglected. Problems were viewed as
activities unto themselves
.
Probable Reasons for the Distortions
There were reasons for these distortions. Some of the
reasons can be given as follows:
(1) Kilpatrick had an either/or position. We either
choose the boy or the corn. A choice framed in this manner
causes one to side with the child-centered approach. The
tendency is to avoid identification with traditional no-
tions of education.
(2) Kilpatrick was lacking in clarity. Without
clarity, there is room for various and sundry interpreta-
tions .
(3) Kilpatrick lost sight of the theoretical base of
Dewey. As time went on, the "project method" became more
and more Kilpatrick's version of education, and less and
less of Dewey's. It could also be argued that Kilpatrick
became more of a Herbartian than a Deweyan.
(4) Distortions can result by uncritically accept-
ing a theory. Cremin points out that Bode was a progres-
sive critic of Dewey. Critical acceptance, as opposed to
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uncritical acceptance, helped to clarify Dewey's position
in Bode ' s mind.
(5) Distortions can result by having a fragmented
understanding of Dewey. This occurrence is related to
^^^^^tically accepting a theory. Many teachers viewed
Dewey's theory as being just problem solving, or learning
by doing. This resulted in a substitution of cliches for
theory. This may happen whenever spokesmen, such as
Kilpatrick, attempt to popularize a theory. Fads result,
which in turn result in distortions. The philosophy tends
to be viewed in bits and pieces. Part-whole relationships
are not made.
The Dewey School
The Laboratory School of the University of Chicago,
1896 to 1903, was Dewey's first and only direct attempt to
implement his philosophy in a school setting. His classic
book. How We Think
,
appeared first in 1910. In the preface,
Dewey pointed out that the ideas in the book were tested
and became concrete in the Laboratory School.
Two teachers in the Laboratory School, Katherine C.
Mayhev; and Anna C. Edwards collaborated with Dewey to
write a book about the school. In the book, they demon-
strated how the method of inquiry was a unifying element
in the school. They said:
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Scientific method was the constantly used tool not
alone in the science laboratories. By common con-
sent it was the method at all times and in all situ-
ations where processes and activities were such that
active investigation, testing out of guesses or
theories, imagining possible results of this or that
physical or social relation could be carried on.^i-
The methoG of inquiry was viewed as a logical exten-
sion of the philosophy of the school. It was not viewed
as something apart from the theory of the school. On this
matter, Mayhew and Edwards stated:
At no time, therefore, in its theory or in its
practices, was there opposition between science
and the school's basic philosophy of value. Sci-
entific method and the assured facts of scientific
investigations were used in daily classroom ex-
perience; activity based upon the results of both
took place; and new consequences of value resulted.
An interdisciplinary approach to the use of method
was used. Method was not seen as belonging to biology or
physics. For example, students learned to cook em.ploying
the method of inquiry. The students were given the con-
cept, "The amount of time needed for cooking any food
depended upon its nature." They constantly tested this
concept. They worked with this concept. It was used to
guide their cooking endeavors. Students used induction.
They inducted the nature of cellulose. They were given
foods and they had to discover the toughness of the
^Katherine C. Mayhew and Anna C. Edwards, The Dewey
School (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts , 1936), p. 271.
^^Ibid., p. 425.
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cellulose. They had to transfer their ideas to other
foods given them. They had to cook using concepts to
guide them. One could say that an omelette was the re-
sult of a test of a concept,
Mayhew and Edwards pointed out:
Each classroom was a social laboratory—a place
to experiment with ideas. The children tested
the efficiency of these ideas by dramatic action.
The teacher was stage director, furnishing the
necessary data (how and where coal is really found,
where forests grow, how men get the trees that
furnish lumber), and when ideas were slack, prompt-
ing with suggestions as to ways and means or
helping with her greater knowledge of techniques.
Connections were made with experience. The experience
story was an important part of the Dewey School. The
attempt was to make experience reflective. If students
visited a dry goods store, they would be asked to write out
simple reading stories based on the experience. Students
44 j T
would not just have the experience. They were to develop
ideas from the experience.
The values of inquiry were emphasized. Mayhew and
Edwards state, "It is impossible to overemphasize the impor-
tance of the spirit of inquiry to the life and growth of
45
a child."
^^Ibid., p. 234.
"^^Wirth, Dewey as Educator , p. 17 4.
^
^Mayhew and Edwards, The Dewey School , p- 430.
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Students were encouraged to develop generalizations.
The process used was one in which classification was
emphasized. Objects were grouped by qualities. For in-
stance, students collected stones of certain colors, sizes,
shapes, and even function, such as the ability to skip
over water. This classification activity established the
base from which stones could be classified more abstractly.
For example, stones could be eventually classified accord-
ing to their method of formation: sedimentary or
46igneous . Mayhew and Edwards pointed out that the value
of classification was that classified knowledge can be used
II . . 47in more mature investigation and research." The
Laboratory School recognized concepts were organized in a
hierarchy according to levels of complexity. Obviously,
Dewey felt it helps to do inquiry when students can build
upon previously learned concepts.
The Dewey School or The Laboratory School, had a
fair degree of structure; that is to say, it did not have
an exaggerated sense of individualism. Solving problems,
developing concepts, processing experience, testing con-
cepts, developing purpose, all of this required a modicum
"^^Ibid
. ,
p . 272 .
^"^Ibid
. , p . 273 .
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structur©. in fact/ "Children were not allowed to
engage in a free selection of activities that had only
immediate appeal." Darnell Rucker had the following
observation:
The silly notion, frequently attributed to Dewey
in particular and to progressive education in
general, that children can be educated by turning
them loose in attractive surroundings to pursue
their impulses helter-skelter makes no sense in
the light of the psychology and social theory of
the Chicago philosophers.^^
Dewey had a theory of occupations which was utilized
to bridge the gap between school and society. The occupa-
tions were used to open inquiry: they were not the end of
inquiry. Arthur Wirth points out, "The children did use-
ful work, grew carrots and lettuce in the garden, and with
them made salads to be eaten at lunch. The occupations
brought the children together in task-oriented groups.
Dewey was attempting to emphasize the cooperative nature
'
»
of human effort.
Mayhew and Edwards state that experimental method in
the Laboratory School had two commandments:
^^Darnell Rucker, The Chicago Pragmatists (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 88.
"^^Ibid.
^^Wirth, Dewey as Educator , p. 291.
51 Ibid
.
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The first was: 'Think in terms of action and in
terms of those acts whose consequences will expand,
revise, test ycpur ideas and theories.' The second'
was like unto it, so like that it was a corollary:
Concern yourself also with the social consequences
of those acts. '52
Dewey's thought matured long after he left the Labora-
tory School, but these two commandments, as Mayhew and
Edwards called them, remained a vital part of his philoso-
phy. Finally Dewey wrote thirty years later, "The suimnary
of the philosophy upon which the work of the school was to
be based may be concluded with an extract from a writing of
a later date, but one which was based upon the earlier
theory as that was developed by the experiences gained in
C -5
the School itself. 'All learning is from experience.'"
Experimentation with concepts was a constant activity
of the Laboratory School. Experimentation meant the child
was active with a purpose. It meant experience was used.
It meant the child was doing.
It should be stressed that the social phase of educa-
tion was put first. Dewey said, "This fact is contrary to
an impression about the school which has prevailed since it
was founded. The Dewey School was community-centered,
^
^Mayhew and Edwards, The Dewey School , p. 438.
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 476
.
^^Ibid
. ,
p . 467.
114
not child-centered. This orientation, of course, fitted
into Dewey's notion of social inquiry. Mayhew and Edwards
pointed out, "In all classes teachers and children started
off the day's work with a face-to-face discussion of coopera-
tive plans for individual and group activity. The
attempt was to create a community and to link up the work
day to the work of another day. The continuity of
experience was used in conjunction with the emphasis on
community
.
In concluding, it should be mentioned that the primary
function of Dewey's Laboratory School was to utilize educa-
tional procedures consistent with his theory. In this
regard, Wirth states, "It seems fair to add that the kinds
of methods and materials utilized in the Dewey School
could not be transferred to mass education enterprises
5 6
where similar resources were lacking." For example, in
The Laboratory School, there was one teacher for every eight
students. Wirth states, "No pretense was made that the
school's procedures could be employed in other school sys-
tems where different conditions prevailed
.
^^Ibid., p. 429.
°Wirth, Dewey as Educator , p. 159.
57
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In any event, what the Laboratory School did was
to establish that theory could be related to practice.
The teachers at the Laboratory School were well aware of
its philosophy. They used and referred to the philosophy
to guide them in their teaching. Appropriately, it was
Dewey who said, "Education is the laboratory in which
philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested."
The existence of The Laboratory School personified this
notion.
5 8John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York:
The Free Press, 1944), p. 329.
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CHAPTER V
INTEGRATING THEORY WITH PRACTICE
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate teaching
strategies that follow from Dewey's theory of inquiry. It
is to integrate theory with practice. The teaching strate-
gies will represent the major philosophical import of
Dewey's theory: his view of knowledge as warranted asser-
tion, his idea of experience as transaction, his idea of
values functioning with skills, and his commitment to an
absence of dualisms in all of human experience.
The examples to be presented will not be of the five
step approach to inquiry: having students confront an
indeterminate situation, identify a problem, seek data,
construct a hypothesis, and test the hypothesis. On this
matter, Paul Nash has remarked, "Some progressive educators
have placed an exclusive emphasis on process that lacks the
synthetic depth of Dewey's pragmatism."^ It should be
added that the strategies to be presented reject a child-
centered approach and a positivistic approach to inquiry.
^Paul Nash, "The Strange Death of Progressive Educa-
tion," Educational Theory 14 (April 1964): 88.
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The examples of inquiry presented here are intended
to show what actually could be done by teachers in our
public schools. They are intended to show that Dewey's
theory of inquiry is dynamic and fluid. The examples are
not recipes. They merely reflect teaching and learning
activities that have a philosophical basis in Dewey's
theory of inquiry
. It is not the contention of the author
that a person unfamiliar with Dewey's theory would not be
doing some of these things. Rather, the contention is that
reasonable to believe that a person familiar with
and committed to Dewey's theory of inquiry would more likely
be doing them, and the contention is that these examples
represent examples of how Dewey's philosophy could be used
to guide teaching behavior
.
Teaching Strategies
Teaching strategies refers to all of those things a
teacher can do to set up learning activities that reflect
the many aspects of inquiry as viewed from the perspective
of Dewey's philosophy. The strategies have one broad goal:
to have students develop skills and values that conform to
Dewey's philosophy. It should be pointed out that each
teaching activity can be related to other teaching activi-
ties. Examples of this relationship will be demonstrated.
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On this matter, George Barton pointed out, "In educational
method, we should not only talk generally about the vari-
ous functions of inquiry, but also specify the subordinate
arts which usually turn out to be worth mastering to make
2inquiry effective."
The implication is the teacher would have strategies
in which students work on inducting concepts, work on using
deduction to test concepts, work on making distinctions
between observing and inference. In addition, there would
be strategies to help students develop inquiry attitudes.
Obviously, there are other strategies that would be in-
volved. The important consideration to keep in mind is that
the teaching strategies are the logical extension of Dewey's
theory, and therefore they must be seen in the context of
his total philosophy. This means that students will not
be spending all of their time solving problems. In essence,
having students work on skills of inquiry does not neces-
sarily mean they will be engaged in solving problems.
The Importance of Concepts
It is assumed that the teacher who plans to teach
others to engage in inquiry thinking must plan and implement
^George E. Barton, Jr., "John Dewey: Too Soon a
Period Piece?" The School Review 67 (Summer 59): 134.
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ways by which students become increasingly more effective
in conceptualizing and in putting concepts to work. It is
hoped the teaching strategies presented will demonstrate
the significance of concepts.
The development of concepts is necessary to inquiry.
This does not mean developing a concept is all there is
inquiry
,
but it does mean that without concepts
,
there
would be no inquiry: concepts are used to guide our in-
quiry. Without concepts we would merely have random
activity. Without concepts, there would be no focus for
the learning activities. A caveat is appropriate here. Do
not equate inquiry with a student deriving his own concept.
Do not associate inquiry with an inductive process. It is
within the framework of Dewey's philosophy for a teacher to
be deductive, that is, to give students concepts. Dewey
said, "It is impossible to understand why a suggestion
from one who has a larger experience and a wider horizon
should not be at least as valid as a suggestion from some
3
more or less accidental source."
There is a danger that students would be asked to
memorize concepts. It is hoped that familiarity with
Dewey's theory would act to prevent this. It is hoped
that by using Dewey's theory as a guide, teachers would
^John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York:
Collier Books, 1938), p. 71.
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understand the function of concepts. There is also a
danger of students mechanically giving examples of concepts.
The philosophical importance of testing should be stressed.
It should be pointed out that giving examples is a form of
a public test of an idea in which personal experience is
used. It should also be pointed out that a student can de-
rive a concept by testing a concept already provided to
him by the teacher. It should be emphasized quite vigor-
ously that in the Deweyan framework, concepts are not the
property of teachers. Concepts are vehicles for students
to become involved with their experience, to become involved
with problems. Many of Dewey's philosophical principles
are subsumed in the test of a concept: the idea of viewing
ideas as tentative, of being open and public, of using
experience, not formal logic, to understand and solve
problems
.
The Functional Relationship
of Strategies
In the examples presented, a person who understands
Dewey's philosophy could perceive the teacher attempting
tc have students do the following: (1) identify problems,
(2) monitor their method of problem solving, (3) use induc-
tion and deduction to make inferences, develop concepts,
of the values of inquiry , develop attitudes(4) become aware
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of inquiry, (5) distinguish between perception and inference,
deal with the Deweyan theory of experience, (6) make classi-
fications, make relationships, (7) test concepts against
experience, (3) seek data.
These strategies transact with one another. For
example, testing a concept against experience transacts
with the values of being open and public. In fact, by
having students test concepts, the teacher is attempting to
do the following: (1) have students use their experience,
(2) have students derive a concept, (3) have students
realize that ideas are tentative, (4) have students dis-
cover problems, (5) have students realize ideas are to
be public and shared, (5) and have students realize that
ideas, abstractions, are real.
Additional strategies are postulated to accompany
the testing strategy. These strategies are designed to
help establish the many philosophical reasons for conduct-
ing a test. Therefore, after the testing of the concept,
the following questions are asked of the students: Does
the concept hold up? Did you discover any new concepts?
Are there any modifications to be made? The students could
also be asked to give more than one example as a test. The
students could be asked to explain how they went about test-
ing the concept. The students could be asked to make
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predictions that would be relevant to the use of the
concept
.
In essence, teaching strategies, whether testing a
concept or developing the rationale for testing, do not
function independently of each other. Teaching strategies
function interdependently
. By doing such, an overall unity
of purpose is an objective of teaching strategies.
Inductive and Deductive Thinking
Before turning to examples of inquiry teaching, in-
ductive and deductive thinking will be discussed. In fact,
Dewey has noted that induction and deduction are key ele-
ments of the cognitive process of inquiry.^
Induction is a manner of thinking in which we take
particular data from our experience and make a generaliza-
tion. In induction, we go from the particular to the
general. For example, John is mortal. Mary is mortal.
Jim is mortal; therefore, all humans are mortal.
Deduction is just the opposite. Deduction is a
manner of thinking in which we go from the general statement
to the particular instance of it. For example, all humans
are mortal. John is a human; therefore, John is mortal.
^John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1933), pp. 182-187.
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As we shall see, the teacher makes use of both induction
and deduction
An Example of a Deductive Strategy
In a language arts class, the teacher could provide
the following concept; "People put different meanings on
the same word." Students would be asked to test this idea
by giving examples of it from their experience. The
teacher would ask for more than one example.
The teacher would ask the students if they could find
any problem situations that would pertain to the concept.
The teacher would ask the students to make a list of the
problems. Students could talk about problems of writing a
will. They could talk about problems of writing a peace
treaty. The teacher could ask what the problem would be in
writing a will or in drafting a peace treaty. The students
would be asked to choose from the list a problem that they
would like to investigate further. They v/ould be asked to
come up with solutions to the problem. The students would
be told that they must list two concepts that they re-
jected as solutions, and they must be able to tell why they
rejected these ideas. The students would have until the end
of the week for this assignment.
The teacher could give an outside assignment in which
the students were again to test the concept "People put
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different meanings on the same word." The students would
be asked to report their findings to the class the next day.
The next day the students could share the results of their
test. The teacher would ask the students if the concept
always held up. He might ask about scientific words. Why
do they tend to be different? The teacher could ask who
got different results when they tested. The teacher would
ask if while testing any new concepts were discovered. One
student might offer
,
"We can often determine the meaning of
a word by its context." The teacher had started off de-
ductively, but now the students would be proceeding induc-
tively. The teacher could attempt to have students transfer
this idea to a problem situation. The students could be
given a problem in which a person is trying to find out what
a particular paragraph means. They could be asked, "Is your
new idea able to fit in here?" Students would be asked to
solve the problem by using their new idea. Students would
be asked to point out the conditions under which the concept
probably would not hold up, or would have to be modified.
For instance, the context may be vague or unclear.
Eventually, the teacher could have students identify
their own language problems and relate how previously
learned concepts can help them. Once again, the attempt
is to have students perceive that ideas are real and can be
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used to solve problems. Of course, the teacher would have
to make sure that the activities are of long enough dura-
tion so that students can really get involved with the
concepts. Therefore, continuity would be established.
Students would work with just two or three of the concepts
all week. There can be additional transference activities
where students have to test the concepts against their ex-
perience. For instance, it is conceivable that students
could test the concepts at home, on the street, or while
playing with other students on the playground.
Obviously, there is much more involved in this teach-
ing episode than the five phases of the logic of inquiry.
As we shall see, the same kinds of teacher strategies ob-
tain when induction is used at the outset.
The Significance of Deduction
A significance of deduction is that it is a process
that occurs at all grade levels. Students come to the
first grade with a host of general principles already formed.
The teacher uses these concepts to lead students to new
experiences, and to help them understand their present ex-
periences. For example, it is found a group of first
graders have developed the concept, "There is the world of
school, and there is the world of home." There is a
division already between school and society. The teacher
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could have students indicate the differences and the
similarities between school and home. In this way, stu-
dents would be classifying their experiences, and the
teacher would be having students transfer into the class-
room a previously learned concept. As the students trans-
fer their idea, they are going from the general to the
particular
.
There are other examples of the significance of de-
duction. Students could be given a problem in which they
have to tell their brother they lost his baseball glove.
Transference of previous ideas developed from experience
is being attempted by the teacher. The teacher could build
in the transference by asking students if they have ever
been in a similar situation. The teacher could ask, "What
ideas did you learn from the similar situation?" The teacher
is attempting to build on the past inferences students have
made from their experiences. To do so, the teacher utilizes
deduction. The student is asked to go from a general prin-
ciple to a particular situation.
The use of deduction also helps to establish purpose.
By beginning deductively and providing students concepts to
v/ork with, the teacher is establishing purpose. Dewey felt
concepts guided inquiry. Concepts make inquiry less ran-
dom. Deductive strategies presuppose the testing of
ideas. A purpose of providing students with ideas is to
have them test the ideas against experience. Deduction
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helps to establish the significance of testing concepts.
Lesson plans are organized conceptually. When a
teacher is employing a deductive strategy, he must have
some concepts in mind. These concepts are relevant to
the learning activity. One of the first things a teacher
would do would be to list the concepts students would be
working with. For example, if a teacher is having students
work on developing the idea, "Human beings are changing all
the time," there would be learning activities that reflect
this concept. Therefore, the teacher could have students
weigh each other. They could measure each other. They
could bring in photographs of themselves as babies. They
could take pictures of themselves. They could bring in
earlier and later pictures of brothers and sisters. The
important point is that all of these activities revolve
around the concept. The concept is unifying the experiences
of the student. A deductive process is being used to
assist the lessons in being organized conceptually.
In sum, in a Deweyan framework, deduction takes on
new prominence: (1) It can be used to test and transfer
ideas against experience. (2) It can be used to help
establish purpose. (3) It can be used to discover new
concepts and new problems. (4) It can be used to organize
learning activities. The misconception with the deductive
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approach, as Dewey has so perceptively pointed out, is
that it is mistakenly viewed as being a very traditional
teaching strategy
. It has been viewed as a strategy that
is teacher dominated.
An Example of an Inductive Strategy
In an inductive strategy, the teacher does not give
the concept nor the problem; he gives the particular data
that may go into the construction of a problem or concept.
The student, on his own, or with the teacher's help, is to
induct the problem or the concept. The students are asked
to transact with the data.
The teacher could give out a sheet of paper with the
following data: Poland is 50 percent rural, 50 percent
urban, 51.4 percent industrialized. Ireland is 60 percent
rural, 40 percent urban, 55 percent industrialized. The
Soviet Union is 45 percent rural, 55 percent urban, 55 per-
cent industrialized. Bolivia is 66 percent rural, 34 per-
cent urban, 12 percent industrialized. The Netherlands is
46 percent rural, 54 percent urban, 40 percent industrial-
ized.
The students could be asked to induct concepts from
this data. The teacher would ask students for their con-
cepts. He will ask students to test their concepts. The
^Ibid., p. 187.
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concept students are working on is, "There is a relation-
ship between industrialization and urbanization." This
concept seems to be warranted by data. However, it will
have to be tested. Also, it is conceivable that students
would derive other concepts from this data. For instance,
one student might come up with, "People tend to migrate
to urban areas when they are in search of opportunities,
or when times are bad; they are hungry." In any event,
the same requirement of a public test would obtain, and
the student should be encouraged to pursue his inference
by testing it.
In dealing with the concept of the relationship be-
tween industrialization and urbanization, students could be
asked to test the concept. One student could offer Sv/eden
as a test. One student could offer Portugal. The teacher
would ask if there were any exceptions to the concept. The
teacher would ask, "Why is testing important?" Students
would be asked to come up with problems to work on. They
might come up with "How can a country become industrialized?"
"What could be some of the bad features of industrializa-
tion?" "How could they be avoided?" "Would industrializa-
tion make for technology which in turn would make for
unemployment?"
These problems might be worked on over a course of
three weeks. The students could report their findings.
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Some students might report that to become industrialized
a country needs a skilled labor force. Some students
might say that a supply of natural resources is important.
Then, questions of having natural resources but not the
technology to develop them could be raised.
One student could say that there would be a prob-
lem of unemployment with too much industrialization. He
niight mean that technology would put people out of work.
He would be asked to give examples. He might cite black-
smiths as an example. He would be asked to give another
example. He could cite typesetters. This problem could
generate much interest. Students might be divided into
groups to work on developing ideas to solve the problem
of high unemployment. They could use as many data sources
as possible. A list might be made of the places that would
have data such as The Department of Labor and The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. A discussion might be begun by the
teacher on why these places would have the data they were
looking for. How do they know what is relevant data to
their problem?
The ideas that students developed in regards to deal-
ing with the problem of unemployment would be reported
to the class. The teacher would ask if these ideas could
be used in their town. He would ask if any of them were
being tested. The teacher is working on transference.
The teacher would ask the students how they would avoid
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unemployment. The attempt is to take what is social and
make it personal. Dewey did not believe in a dualism
between society and the individual. Thus, a teacher
^i^ht ask if an idea holds up for you does that mean it
will hold up for everyone? It is important to note that
the teacher could have given students data on unemploy-
ment and automation which may have been used for problem
discovery. The could have inducted the problem.
The Significance of Induction
The inductive process takes place at all grade levels.
Students in the second grade can be given rods of various
length and color. These rods could be used by students to
construct relationships. A black and yellow rod in length
could be equal to a red rod in length. Students could be
given problems such as, "What will equal two blue rods?"
With an inductive strategy, the building of the con-
>
cept can be aided by the number of particular instances
given. Taba and Elzey pointed out, "It is not beyond
possibility, therefore, that many slow learners can achieve
a high level of abstract thought, provided that they have
the opportunity to examine a greater number of concrete
instances than the teaching process typically allows."
^Hilda Taba and Freeman F. Elzey, "Teaching Strategies
and Thought Processes," Teachers College Record (March
1964 ): 528 .
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ThG Subordinats Arts of Inquiry
A teacher using Dewey's theory as a guide would
help students "master the subordinate arts" which are
necessary to making inquiry effective. Some of the sub-
ordinate arts are as follows:
Classification
. Classification is the ability to per-
ceive similarities and differences and group accordingly.
By itself, classification does not have great significance.
However, in light of Dewey's theory of inquiry, classifi-
cation takes on added significance. Classification is
part of the inquiry process. When we classify, we make
relationships. The construction of relationships is the
very heart of inquiry. In fact, if a student is having
difficulties making relationships, he may be having trouble
classifying. It should be stressed that classification is
not an end in and of itself. It is the ability to realize
that classification is a part of the whole inquiry theory,
that it can be linked to other skills and attitudes, that
sets the inquiry teacher off from the teacher who uses
classification in a routine manner, or as an end in itself.
Distinguishing between perception and inference . A sub-
ordinate art of Dewey's theory of inquiry is the ability
to distinguish betv/een perception and inference. This
ability makes use of Dewey's conception of experience. In
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Dewey's conception, experience does not merely write upon
us. We process our experience. We inquire into it. For
example, students could test the concept, "The outward
appearance of something can sometimes give us misleading
information. ' Students could also be given problem situ-
ations in which they are to develop this concept inductive-
ly. In any event, they would still have to test the con-
cept. Questions could be asked such as, "Can two things
look the same but act very differently?" An example could
be a very inflated basketball and a very deflated basket-
ball.
Students could be given a picture of two men. One
man is very slim. The other is quite robust. The teacher
asks, "Which man is the truck driver?" "What do you need
to do before you can give a reasonable answer?" Dewey's
philosophy provides the base from which teachers could
help students distinguish between what they observe and
what they infer.
Developing the values of inquiry . A person using Dewey's
theory of inquiry as a basis for teaching strategies could
have strategies to assist students in developing the values
of inquiry. Students could be asked "What would change
your mind on an issue?" They could be asked questions
that deal with the revising of an opinion. Questions could
be asked which deal with the difference between a warranted
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assertion and an absolute assertion. The teacher could
ask students to give examples of inquiry being used to
assist in making a decision as compared to other proce-
dures being used. Comparison and contrast could be used
when planning lessons around the values of inquiry.
Questions could be asked such as, "How do you think in-
quiry can contribute to man's sense of dignity?"
The use of interest and purpose . There would be strategies
in which students would be encouraged to use their interest
to lead them on to inquiry. If their interest does not
lead them to use inquiry, the teacher, at the very least,
could establish purpose with students for what they are
doing. The hope is to transform interest into purpose.
At the same time, a teacher should become aware of students'
interests. He should get to know his students.
The important awareness for the teacher is not to
repeat the mistake of the "project method." The teacher
should not yield to the student's momentary interest with-
out a purpose being developed. In fact, interest may come
later after purpose has been established. It is important
to keep in mind that interest does not automatically re-
sult in inquiry.
The notion of purpose can be used to illustrate how the
various parts of Dewey's theory transact with one another.
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To have inquiry, there must be purpose, and to have pur-
pose, there must be concepts. For example, if a teacher
desires to establish a purpose for having students read
a certain book, he might provide the students concepts to
test against the content of the story. On the other hand,
the teacher could have the students develop concepts from
the story. The teacher, then, could have the students
test the concepts against experience.
Question asking strategies
. Questions could be asked that
encourage students to construct relationships. The ques-
tions could direct students ' attention towards looking for
similarities and differences. Questions could be struc-
tured in such a way as to build in the inductive process.
These questions would have students take their particular
answers to questions and make a generalization with them.
For example, students could be given the following:
In Alaska dog sleds are sometimes used to carry things.
While in India, the people sometimes use elephants. In
the rugged mountain areas of South America, donkeys are
many times used to carry things. The following questions
are asked: "Would the people of India use a dog sled or
an elephant?" "VJould people from Alaska use elephants?"
"Why are donkeys used to carry things up and down moun-
tains?" "What animal is used in desert areas?" "Why?"
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The students then could be asked to look at their answers
and see if they can come up with an idea. They could then
be asked to test their idea. They could be asked to share
their test with their classmates. They could be asked to
make classifications with Alaska, India, South America.
They could be asked to make classifications with dog sleds,
donkeys, elephants. The students could be given problems
in which they would have to choose a particular mode of
travel to get where they wanted to go. The students could
give reasons for their choice. Students could be asked to
predict what they think travel in the future would be like.
They could be asked to use the ideas they developed from
the assignment the teacher gave them to help make the
prediction.
The use of experience . There would be strategies designed
to promote students working on problems that are related
to their experiences. Dewey’s principle of transaction
is used as the basis for implementing teaching in which
connections are made between social problems and personal
experience. Transaction means that experience does not
go on inside a person. Transaction states that the personal
could not exist without the social. There has to be some-
thing outside of the person to give rise to the problem.
Social problems are presented to students because these
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problems are part of students' experiences. Dewey feels a
teacher should honor a student's attempt to solve a so-
called personal problem." This does not mean, however,
he solves it in any manner he desires or without guidance
from the teacher. A student is not left to figure out
how to play a guitar or build a jet engine on his own.
This would be the child-centered approach to education.
Dewey is interested in students synthesizing their per-
sonal experiences with social problems. In this regard,
it is consistent with Dewey's philosophy to help students
make the connection between social problems and individual
experience
.
It follows that there would be teaching strategies
designed to promote the student's ability to make functional
relationships or connections between what goes on in one
part of experience to other parts of experience. Questions
designed to promote the ability of make functional relation-
ships would be asked. For instance, a group of students
was once asked, "Why do you think cattle farmers in South
Dakota read the paper to watch the unemployment in the East?"
One student replied, "If there is much unemployment in the
East, people will not be buying steaks."
It also follows that social problems would be con-
stantly presented to students, and they would be asked to
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perceive how these social problems connected to their own
experiences. In other words, they would be asked to make
a functional relationship between a social problem and
personal experience.
An Example of the Non-Use of Experience
in Inquiry Teaching
Making a connection between the social and the per-
sonal may not always happen in inquiry teaching. For
example, it is possible to give students an assignment in
which they have to construct a map showing the distribu-
tion of wheat production in the fifteen leading wheat pro-
ducing states from 1955 to 1959. The data sheet the teacher
provides the students reflects that in Ohio from 1954 to
1959 wheat decreased from 45 million to 29 million bushels.
Why? We have a problem. The class suggests two hypotheses.
"The decrease in wheat occurred because other crops were
able to compete successfully for acreage previously used
for wheat." "The decrease in wheat was associated with a
decline in county wheat acreage allotment." In the first
hypothesis, farmers may have decided to plant more soybeans.
In the second hypothesis, the state may have decided to
cut back on its subsidy. These two concepts are tested.
Data is obtained from the state department of agriculture.
The data indicates hypothesis two should be accepted.
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foj^sgoing was an Gxainple of a problem situation
in which students went through the five steps of problem
solving very mechanistically and very skillfully. Yet,
there was no connection between the problem and students'
experiences. A conscious reference to Dewey's theory would
inform the teacher that inquiry teaching does not end here.
The end of inquiry is not solving a problem. Connections
remain to be made between personal experience.
The same situation revisited . The same teaching situation
is further developed by another teacher. He asks the stu-
dents, "How might a lower wheat yield personally affect
you?" One student says that there would be less bread.
Another student points out that this would mean that his
family would have to pay higher prices for bread. The
student is asked why. The student responds that whenever
something is scarce it becomes valuable. The teacher asks
the student to test this. The student cites the recent
oil shortage. The student is asked for another test.
The student cites some rare stamps that he had bought from
a friend.
In essence, in this situation, the teacher took the
problem and connected it to the students ' experiences . In
the first situation, this was not done. The first situa-
tion was an inductive, intellectual exercise. In this
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situation, the teacher was not only interested in getting
students to solve a problem, he wanted students to use
their experience.
The Significance of a Conceptual
Framework
It is a contention of this author that if and in
what manner inquiry is used is related to one's conceptual
framework. This contention suggests that any transmission
of knowledge has the potential to be used for inquiry. For
example, a teacher could use the Cleveland Telephone
Directory as a data source for inquiry. A social studies
course could conceivably be built around the Cleveland
Telephone Directory. Students could be asked to make rela-
tionships from the data. Problems could be given which
could stimulate inquiry and the development of concepts.
Students could be asked, "Why is there a large number of
names ending with 'ski' living in one particular part of
the city?" This does not mean that anything beyond the
mere transmission of data is inquiry. It does mean that
any transmission of data can be used by the teacher to
develop inquiry thinking in students. It does mean any
experiences that students have can potentially be used
for reflective thinking. Whether or not this is accom-
plished is dependent, to a large extent, upon the teacher s
philosophical outlook.
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Summary
In many of the examples of practical applications,
the teacher provided the problems, the data, and the con-
cepts. The teacher had students use their experiences.
The teacher asked questions that dealt with the transfer-
ence of ideas. The teacher worked on the values of inquiry.
Concepts were tested so that students could become av/are
that ideas are tentative and not absolute. Ideas were
tested so that students could become aware of the impor-
tance of connecting ideas to experience.
The practical applications all had in common an
active teacher providing guidance and direction to students.
In fact, these examples were very insistent on conveying
Dewey's notion of the guiding role of the teacher. Dewey
said, "Guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of
the pupil's intelligence is an aid to freedom, not a restric-
tion upon it."”^ In sum, Dewey, felt a teacher who is not
afraid to assume a strong leadership role in the classroom
will be better able to develop the skills and the values of
inquiry with his students.
^ Dewey, Experience and Education , p. 71.
CHAPTER V I
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOmENDATIONS
It will be the purpose of this final chapter to present
conclusions and recominendations regarding the use of Dewey's
theory of inquiry as a basis for the development of inquiry
teaching
.
Conclusions
1. Inquiry is more than problem solving. When inquiry is
viewed only as a method of problem solving, it is perceived
as a logic, not as a philosophy. It is absurd to think
that students would be solving problems all of the time.
This is a restricted view of inquiry. Dewey's theory of
inquiry can only be understood in the context of his total
philosophy. It is maintained by the author that unless
this recognition is acted upon it appears likely that the
five cognitive steps of inquiry will be seen as the sum
and substance of Dewey's theory of inquiry. However,
Dewey's philosophy encourages a multitude of uses for
inquiry. Thus, viewing inquiry as only problem solving
will result in the full depth and breadth of Dewey's
philosophy being neglected.
142
143
The significance of Dewey's theory of inquiry is in
its relationship to a broader philosophical view. it is
conceivable that an understanding of the philosophical view
could do much to help one understand that inquiry is more
than problem solving.
2. With the aid of an understanding of Dewey's theory, most
teaching that goes on in classrooms theoretically could, with
intellectual effort and commitment, be transformed into in-
quiry teaching
. Whatever the teacher is presently doing
with students could be used as an entry point for inquiry
teaching. From the entry point, the other components of
inquiry could be eventually developed.
For example, whenever teachers disseminate data, this
data could be used to initiate inquiry. Students could be
asked to construct concepts from the data. The teacher who
now provides concepts to students for non-inquiry purposes
such as memorization could ask students to test the concepts.
The teacher who asks questions could structure question ask-
ing to build in the induction of concepts. The teacher
who has students read for information could ask students
to construct relationships from what they read.
Once the teacher examines his classroom practices in
the light of Dewey's philosophy, the teacher who now has
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students work on skills in isolation, such as classifica-
tion skills, could see where his practices fit into Dewey's
total philosophy.
Whether teachers should make the transformation is
another question. The point to be made here is that an
examination of present teaching efforts in light of Dewey's
theory of inquiry could play an important role in trans-
forming present teaching efforts. An examination of
present teaching strategies in light of Dewey's theory
could be accomplished through in-service education.
3. Deduction has a significant role to play in Dewey's
theory of inquiry. With Dewey's theory, one teaching objec-
tive is the discovery of relationships. As students begin
deductively to test a concept against experience, they may
discover new concepts.
Deduction is more than simply providing students with
concepts. Deduction is a part of other aspects of inquiry,
such as developing an experimental attitude that holds con-
cepts are to be tested and revised against experience.
It was Dewey's hope that students would grow as they
developed concepts from their experiences and as they re-
vised concepts in the light of new experience. Students
come to school with a host of general principles already
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formed. The teacher uses these concepts to lead students
to new experiences. Dewey was aware that educational re-
formers were concerned that a deductive approach to inquiry
could prohibit rather than promote growth. As this
dissertation has indicated, Dewey felt it was a mistake
on the part of educational reformers to oppose deduction
to growth. According to Dewey, deduction used properly,
that is, not in isolation, can even be used to motivate
inquiry .
^
It has been pointed out elsewhere in the dissertation
that many inquiry teaching efforts tend to emphasize only
induction because of a conception of scientific method as
an inductive method.
4. The two most common distortions of Dewey's theory are
an exclusive child-centered view of the learning process,
and a positivistic view of Dewey's theory of inquiry.
The positivistic distortions, as pointed out in this
study, are difficult to perceive at first glance because
of similarities between positivism and Dewey's pragmatism.
The paramount similarity is that both positivism and Dewey's
pragmatism are empirical philosophies. Dewey's theory of
inquiry becomes positivistic when values are deemed to be
“John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1933), p. 187.
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subjective and therefore not capable of experiential veri-
fication. In other words, to place the ethical outside
the domain of inquiry method would be to distort Dewey's
views of inquiry towards a positivistic view. In addition,
Dewey's theory of inquiry could be distorted to a positivis-
tic emphasis whenever inquiry is viewed as having the
solving of problems as its sole objective. In Dewey's
viev7, using inquiry to solve problems is a means to develop
humanistic values of tolerance and openness
.
It has been pointed out that an exclusive child-
centered approach is more Kilpatrickean than Deweyan
.
John J. McDermott states, "Contrary to the oft-held view,
Dewey's position is not that of a child-centered classroom,
if that means learning is subordinate to the whim of the
2
child." Obviously, this does not mean that Dewey neglects
the experience and the interests of the child. It does
not mean that Dewey neglects the developmental level of
the child. In these respects, Dewey focuses on the child.
On the other hand, it does mean that Dewey did not oppose
the child to the curriculum or oppose the child to the
teacher. Any such antithesis was rejected forthrightly
by Dewey as a distortion of his philosophy. It has been
^John J. McDermott, The Philosophy of John Dewey :
The Lived Experience (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973)
p . 46 8.
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pointed out in this dissertation that Kilpatrick presented
educators with an antithesis : either they choose the boy
or they choose the corn.
In talking about Dewey's ideas being distorted to
mean an exclusive child-centered view, Richard Hofstadter
stated
:
The concept of individual growth became hostage in
the hands of educational thinkers who were obsessed
with the child-centered school. Although Dewey
himself did not accept the antithesis between the
child and society as a finality— indeed, he hoped
to achieve a harmonious synthesis of the two—the
historical effect of the conception of education
as growth was to exalt the child and dismiss the
problem of society, on the ground that the growth
of the child stood for health, whereas the tradi-
tions of society (including curricular traditions)
^
stood for outworn excessively authoritative demands.
The exclusive child-centered view was the position of
Kilpatrick. As stated earlier in this dissertation, Bayles
felt that Kilpatrick's child-centered view was a distortion
of Dewey's philosophy. Needless to say, claiming that the
child-centered view is a Deweyan view has been the source
of much debate.
^Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American
Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 374.
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5. Inquiry teaching requires structure. Inquiry teaching
is directive. In Dewey's view, students do not have a
directionless education. The child is not left to himself
without guidance from the teacher. Dewey feels that the
teacher supplies the "environing conditions which are
requisite to start and guide thought."^
It was Dewey's hope that an understanding of and a
commitment to his philosophy would be a major factor in a
teacher developing a directive approach which furthered
rather than curtailed inquiry. The absence of a directive
approach is not justified by Dewey's philosophy. What is
justified by Dewey's philosophy is that a teacher can be
directive and still help students make connections between
their personal experience and their formal education. A
teacher can guide, direct, and help a student develop in-
quiry skills and values; such guidance does not necessarily
lead to a restriction of thought.
Inquiry teaching, to a large degree, is dependent upon
students becoming aware of the structure of inquiry and of
the norms governing that structure. The norms extend
^John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1902), p. 18.
149
from being open and public to perceiving ideas as warranted
assertions rather than as absolute truths. Some additional
norms of inquiry that students could be made aware of are a
willingness to change with new data, a willingness to share
ideas, and a respect for abstractions as having a grounding
in experience. These norms are derived from the philosophy
of Dewey. These norms are made working principles of the
classroom. It was Dewey's hope that the structuring in of
these and other norms by the teacher would help to establish
a framework conducive to inquiry. As noted previously, an
explicit classroom structure with explicit norms appeared
to be a characteristic of the Dewey Laboratory School
6. Dewey's notion of transaction could be utilized as a
principle of learning theory. Mere transaction, by itself,
does not assure learning, but in Dewey's view, it is a
vital principle of the learning process that could be util-
ized by the teacher in his planning of learning experiences
for students.
Exactly how people learn remains to be found. Hov/ever
Dewey's principle of transaction maintains that the learner
is not born with innate ideas, nor does the learner simply
have ideas imprinted on him by the environment. In Dewey's
view, most behavior of human beings is learned behavior.
Most learning is the result of a transaction v/ith an environ
ment
.
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The significance of this is that if a teacher is
employing transaction as a principle of learning theory,
the student would be asked to be active with ideas. Stu-
dents would be asked to test ideas. Students would be
asked to transfer ideas from one experience to another
experience. In short, ideas have an instrumental charac-
ter: they are to be acted upon. Ideas are to be operation-
alized. In Dewey's view, it would follow that if the stu-
dent remains passive and merely is asked to memorize
ideas and facts, there is very little transaction, and
there is very little learning. Dewey, of course, maintained
that activity must be purposeful. Activity unto itself will
not necessarily result in learning.
The much celebrated pedagogical maxim, "We learn by
doing" is a conception of transaction as a learning prin-
ciple in which students are purposefully active with ideas.
7. Positivism is a dominant philosophy in our culture.
Positivistic approaches to inquiry teaching are approaches
in vogue. The positivistic approaches to inquiry do not
necessarily come about because of a reading and investiga-
tion into the philosophy of positivism. It is more likely
that the positivistic approaches come about because of the
ascendancy in our culture of a science that is divorced from
value questions. The ascendancy of a science that Habermas
151
spoke of in which technical questions are readily addressed
while normative questions are dismissed or avoided is quite
hospitable to a positivistic outlook.
A few other examples of the influence of positivism
in education are suggested here. Undoubtedly, there are
^^.riables involved. Nonetheless, it is maintained
that the influence of positivism is a significant variable
at work. There is the influence of measurement. Positivism
attempts to be precise. Measurement is important. Positiv-
ism attempts to be quantitative, to reduce experience to
statistics. High test scores on the part of students tend
to be equated with having a good school system. A
positivistic influence contributes to schools being run
with a business-oriented mentality. In many respects, the
positivistic emphasis on quantification contributes to
superintendents and principals being viewed as efficient
managers and not as educational leaders. In fact, being
able to present taxpayers with cost-cutting measures may
be one of the most important traits of an administrator.
8. A diminution of dualistic thinking would help to lower
a resistance to Dewey's theory of inquiry. Many people are
resistant to Dewey's philosophy because of the powerful
influence of dualistic thought. Dualism is quite prevalent.
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Some of the forms that it takes are: (1) Facts are
separated from values; (2) Prescriptions are separated
from descriptions; (3) Value questions are separated from
the process of inquiry; inquiry can only settle scientific
questions; (4) The affective is separated from the cogni-
tive. Dualistic thought also makes it easier for positiv-
istic versions of inquiry to predominate over Deweyan
versions: positivism would accept a division between an
objective world and a subjective world. In essence, a
challendge to dualistic thought could do much in estab-
lishing a framework for acceptance of Dewey's thought.
9. Dewey's theory of inquiry requires the use of teaching
strategies that take an integrated approach. An integrated
approach means that each teaching activity can be related
to other teaching activities. For example, classification
works with deduction, which in turn works with induction.
Functional relationships exist among the subordinate parts
of Dewey's theory. These relationships make it easier to
make connections between one teaching strategy and another
teaching strategy. The implication is that there are many
different learning activities which can be related.
An integrated approach also has implications for
diagnostic teaching. For example, if a student is having
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trouble inducting concepts, this skill could be isolated
and worked on. Later, the teacher could have the student
work on testing the concepts he had inducted. For example,
a student may be experiencing difficulty in making rela-
tionships from data. The teacher could have the student
work on only this skill. Later, the teacher could have
the student work on the skill of making functional rela-
tionships, connecting social problems to personal exper-
ience. The important consideration is that all of these
strategies are logical extensions of Dewey's philosophy,
and that all of these strategies are related.
10. Inquiry teaching according to Dewey's theory requires,
among other things, that the teacher have developed a con-
ceptual framework. A person unfamiliar with Dewey's theory
could be a highly skilled inquiry teacher. Many of the
things such a teacher does could be highly congruent to
Dewey's philosophy. This is possible. However, reason
and experience tend to make for the conclusion that such a
teacher would be the exception, not the rule. It is more
reasonable to believe that knowledge of Dewey's theory and
a commitment to it will act as a major factor in leading
to teaching behavior according to his philosophy. Obvious-
ly, knowledge and commitment are not sufficient unto them-
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selves, but they could go a long way to teaching according
to Dewey's philosophy.
Once a teacher has developed the conceptual frame-
work, the opportunities to develop inquiry thinking in
students are greatly enhanced. Dewey saw the possibilities
for inquiry in almost anything
. This means that materials
snd textbooks cannot be blamed for the lack of inquiry
teaching. The key to the use of materials is the teacher's
conceptual framework.
With such a framework, even a can of peas could be
viewed as a vehicle for the initiation of inquiry. For
example, a student could be asked, "Why are the higher
priced peas called French, and why do they have a fancy
label?" This question could set in motion many inquiry
types of behavior on the part of students. Concepts of
status could be generated and tested by students. New
concepts could be discovered from the testing of concepts.
Problems of class structure could be discovered by some
students. Other students may discover other problems. It
is hard to know what problems some students may discover
.
Concepts of transportation, concepts of dealing with adver-
tising, of appealing to people's vanities, could be gener-
ated by students. Concepts dealing with the role of govern-
ment, the pure food and drug act, and interstate commerce
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could be generated.
The can of peas is a vehicle for inquiry. It is a
starting point for inquiry. It is not inquiry itself.
The point to be made is that the teacher's conceptual
framework could be such as to perceive any old thing, in
this case, a can of peas, as a vehicle for inquiry teaching
It should be noted that the teaching of inquiry re-
quires the same conceptual framework as the ability to do
inquiry. The difference is more of a role difference than
a conceptual difference. However, a good part of the
teacher's role is determined by the teacher's conceptual
framework
.
Recommendations
As a result of this investigation, the following
recommendations regarding the use of Dewey's theory as a
basis for the development of inquiry teaching strategies
are made:
1. Teachers must be engaged philosophically. This means
that teachers should be able to identify philosophical pos
tions . It means teachers should be able to perceive that
ideas, abstractions, are real. They should be made aware
that the ideas of human beings have practical consequences
Teachers should be made aware of their own philosophical
proclivities and the possible consequences of them.
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There should be assignments in which teacher educa-
tion students identify philosophical positions and are
to predict what the resultant educational system
would be like. For example, a rationalist would tend to
emphasize the classics.
Students of education should develop a critical view
of Dewey's theory. One way to deal with the distortions
of Dewey's theory is to teach the theory critically. Stu-
dents could read criticisms of Dewey. They could be made
aware of the issues his philosophy raises.
Dualism could be confronted by assuring that the
theory of inquiry is not taught apart from the philosophy
of Dewey. In fact, explanations of Dewey's theory of
inquiry should hold the topic of problem solving until the
end. Other aspects of the theory, such as the values of
inquiry and the role of experience, should be discussed
first. This would help to assure that other elements of
Dewey's theory are included along with problem solving.
Philosophical feedback should be given to teachers.
There has yet been no such attempt, to my knowledge, to
design a teacher observation procedure that takes into con-
sideration whether a teacher is relating theory to practice
or whether a teacher has thought about the philosophical
and practical implications of his ideas
.
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In fact, students should take a course in philosophy
while they are doing their student teaching. During this
time, feedback sessions could be provided that deal with
how well a student teacher related theory to practice.
Feedback sessions could be given on the relation of one's
ideas to one's teaching.
2. There should be new teaching certification requirements
based on philosophical skills and attitudes. The new re-
quirements would be based on teachers being able to identify
philosophical positions and the consequences of these posi-
tions .
The present competency based movement towards certi-
fication requirements tends to be positivistic. Its propo-
nents tend to emphasize the demonstration of objective,
quantifiable skills. The importance of abstractions is
being neglected. Therefore, to remedy this trend, skills
and attitudes of philosophy should be part of the new cert-
ification requirements.
3. It would help the teacher educator or the person giving
an inservice workshop to use the concepts available on the
conditions most favorable to an open mind, and those condi-
tions most unfavorable to having an open mind. For example,
a person open to Dewey's version of inquiry considers the
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consequences of his ideas. He is not an absolutist. He
treats ideas as tentative. He is flexible. He is not
afraid to be wrong. He enjoys solving problems. He
tends to delay making judgments. He waits for the evi-
dence. He does not have need for an absolute resolution
to every problem.^
The person most resistant to Dewey's inquiry tends
to have a closed mind. He has a need for absolutes. He
has a need to follow authority. He believes what he wants
to in spite of evidence to the contrary. He is a dualist.
He separates emotion from reason. He separates theory
from practice. He has strong needs to conform to the norms
of the group. He is afraid to experiment. The need for
g
security is so overpowering as to be debilitating.
It would also help an inservice educator to be aware
of the social conditions that are hostile to the development
of Dewey's ideas. It would aid the inservice educator in
that he would be able to anticipate resistance, and there-
fore he could devise strategies accordingly.
^Jchn Dewey, How V7e Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1933), pp. 27-28.
^Ibid.
,
pp. 28-34
.
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The social conditions hostile to inquiry tend to be
totalitarian. There tend to be severe limitations on
freedom. There is censorship. There are not any free
elections. Civil liberties are denied. There is, in
essence, a chilling effect on thought. All of these traits
do not need to be present to have the chilling effect.
An example of a condition inimical to inquiry is the
McCarthy Era.
Social conditions favorable to inquiry tend to be
democratic. People have the opportunity to meet and dis-
cuss affairs of civic interest. Dissent is tolerated.
Society is relatively open. Data is made available to cit-
izens in order that they may have the basis for intelligent
.
. 7decisions
.
4. It would be wise to fit Dewey's theory into the pre-
vailing social and individual ethos. Inquiry should use
the prevailing norms of an educational system. The estab-
lished norms would be the point of entry. For example, the
current trend is to emphasize basic education. Therefore,
it should be shown that the basics can be developed at the
same time inquiry skills and attitudes are developed. In
fact, it should be demonstrated that inquiry skills can
"^John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (Boston: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1933), p. 145.
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aid in the development of basic skills. If there is a
question of content coverage or basic factual information
that students should have, it could be stressed that more
facts, not less, are needed for inquiry. It could be
stressed that developing the basic ability to read can
aid a student in gathering data which is necessary for
the construction of concepts.
5. A reinforcement system should be established to reward
Deweyan teaching behavior. The climate of the school will
reflect the climate of society. The school climate is
presently constructed so as not to give extrinsic rewards
for teachers who use inquiry in the Deweyan fashion. Any
reward such teachers receive tends to be intrinsic. On the
other hand, an administrator could give extrinsic rewards
to supplement the intrinsic rewards. Study hall periods
could be reduced. Praise and encouragement could be given.
In essence, there should be some kind of extrinsic reward
system instituted.
6. Inservice workshops should be designed to convert present
teaching efforts to conform with Dewey's philosophy. Rathe^
than from theory to practice, the design of the workshops
would go from practice to theory. The relationship between
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theory and practice would be established exper ientially
.
In any event, all recommendations for inquiry teaching
should be built around the proposition that a thorough ac-
quaintance with Dewey's philosophy is essential. The
philosophy should be grasped in its entirety and not
merely in its parts
. Much damage has already been done
by taking a part of Dewey's thought and neglecting other
parts. When this happens, the whole of Dewey's thought is
neglected. Therefore, the whole of Dewey's philosophy
must be presented to teachers, not bits and parts of it.
It is highly recommended that the inservice education stress
Dewey's theory as being experimental theory. Without such
stressing, proselytizing rather than educating could occur.
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Author’s Observations
The teaching strategies that have been presented
here have been derived from a particular interpretation
of Dewey's ideas. There are other interpretations of
Dewey's philosophy that advocate a more child-centered
view of the teaching/learning process than the interpre-
tation presented here. In this regard, the work of
Harold Rugg and Ann Schumacher, authors of The Child
Centered School come to mind. Dewey warned against
getting into an either/or position between child-cen-
tered and teacher-centered points of viev;. Recognition
of Dewey's admonition is reflected in the interpretation
and in the teaching strategies derived from, the interpre-
tation .
The author feels that a key to understanding Dewey
is to place his ideas in experiential situations. In
short, it helps to view abstractions as real. It helps
to relate theory to practice. Viewing ideas apart from
experiential situations may make for confusion regarding
Dewey's philosophy. Accordingly, this interpretation of
Dewey's philosophy was com.bined with practical examples.
These examples reflect an interpretation of Dewey in which
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it is the teacher's task to assert educational leadership
in the classroom to stimulate the inquiry process. With-
out this leadership on the part of teachers, it is unlikely
that Dewey's philosophy will receive a test in practice.
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